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I. Introduction
Look up. Domestic unmanned aircraft have arrived and may
be coming to a city near you.1
The drone revolution promises to increase substantially the
ability of law enforcement to serve and protect their jurisdictions.
Drones are unique because they often lack the technical
limitations and restrictive costs of manned aircraft.2 Their
potential for a positive impact on society is substantial, but
1. See, e.g., Michael McAuliff, FBI’s Robert Mueller: Drones Are in Use in
America, THE HUFFINGTON POST (June 19, 2013), http://www.huffington
post.com/2013/06/19/robert-mueller-drones_n_3466400.html?ncid=edlinkusaolp
00000003#slide=592888 (last visited June 21, 2013) (“FBI Director Robert
Mueller revealed Wednesday that the bureau uses drones to conduct
surveillance on U.S. soil.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Mueller testified to Congress on June 19, 2013 about the FBI’s drone program.
Id. He added that FBI policies regarding drone use and privacy are still in the
initial stages of development. Id. Police have made at least one arrest on
American soil in which drone surveillance played an acknowledged and
important role. See Edward Humes, Eyes in the Sky, CALIFORNIA LAWYER, Aug.
2013, at 21 (“Sheriff Kelly Janke said the Predator overflight—which would not
have required a warrant if performed by a piloted craft—helped deputies stage a
safe, nonviolent arrest.”).
2. See generally discussion infra Part II.B.
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drones also carry a potential for abuse. The technology can
outstrip certain constitutional protections and case law governing
naked-eye aerial observation by police. A possible reassurance
may be that police have no desire to track and observe average
Americans.3 But the danger of abuse may already be realized.4
Indeed, the revelations surrounding the National Security
Agency’s surveillance programs underscore the lengths to which
the federal government will go to use technology in the pursuit of
fighting crime and terrorism and that such technology is subject
to abuse.5
Consider the following hypothetical. City police launch three
drones from a municipal airport just after dawn. Drone 1
operates at 10,000 feet, carries downward-looking cameras, and
can remain aloft for twelve continuous hours to follow targets
below. It will stay overhead in the public airways to track and
3. See Tim Redmond, Alameda County’s Spy Drone, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (EFF) (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.eff.org/mention/alameda-countysspy-drone (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (“Sheriff Gregory Ahern has insisted in
public statements and in communications to the Board of Supervisors that he
wants to use said drone only for search and rescue missions, disaster response,
and . . . [observing] wildfires.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
4. See Mark Mazzetti, The Drone Zone, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY MAGAZINE, at
MM32 (July 8, 2012) (describing the author’s experience as a member of the
media granted access to the Air Force’s primary drone pilot training center at
Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico). Mazzetti details training practices that
may include tracking unsuspecting motorists on the roads below:
A white S.U.V. traveling along a highway adjacent to the base came
into the cross hairs in the center of the screen and was tracked as it
headed south along the desert road. When the S.U.V. drove out of the
picture, the drone began following another car.
“Wait, you guys practice tracking enemies by using civilian cars?” a
reporter asked. One Air Force officer responded that this was only a
training mission, and then the group was quickly hustled out of the
room.
5. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, U.S. Surveillance Architecture Includes
Collection of Revealing Internet, Phone Metadata, THE WASHINGTON POST (June
15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-surveillance-archi
tecture-includes-collection-of-revealing-internet-phone-metadata/2013/06/15/e9b
f004a-d511-11e2-b05f-3ea3f0e7bb5a_story.html (last visited June 21, 2013)
(describing the National Security Agency’s clandestine surveillance
architecture, the full extent of which came to light in May and June, 2013) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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identify the individuals coming and going from an open courtyard
within an estate. Assume that Drone 1 is completely
imperceptible to naked-eye observation from the ground.
Drone 2 is small and operates only at low altitudes where
larger, manned aircraft cannot fly. It will target the individuals
mentioned above by hovering silently at varying distances from
the house (some at fifteen feet over a field, some above a public
street, etc.). Drone 3 is also small, but travels to the scene of a
forest fire on the edge of town. City police have equipped these
smaller drones with a variety of cameras and listening devices,
none of which amplify sensory inputs above normal human
perception. Additionally, the smaller drones are equipped with
navigational cameras that capture a continuous feed of video
from start to finish. If a policeman were at these unusual drone
flight altitudes, he would hear and see exactly as these drones do.
If present law is applied, are the targeted individuals
protected from the warrantless observations made by these
drones?6 Now assume that their general capabilities have become
commonly known, much like those of a typical police helicopter
today. How might the law vary for each drone under these
assumptions, if and when police rapidly expand their use of
drones? The answers to these questions about Drones 1, 2, and 3
are worth knowing.
In general, the Fourth Amendment7 protects Americans from
unreasonable searches and seizures.8 The home has long been
6. Under current law these warrantless observations may not be barred
by the Fourth Amendment because they do not penetrate a home’s private
interior and they were made from aircraft flying at a legal altitude (presuming
that the FAA has specifically approved Drones 2 and 3–4 for safe use in
alleyways). See Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Unmanned Aerial Exposure: Civil
Liability Concerns Arising from Domestic Law Enforcement Employment of
Unmanned Aerial Systems, 85 N.D. L. REV. 623, 642 (2009) (“Homeowners have
no expectation to privacy with respect to that which can be viewed from above
during legal passage by aircraft.” (quotations omitted)). “Where a [drone]
captures images that could have been obtained from civilian aircraft travelling
in a legally authorized manner, privacy claims are limited. Consumers lack a
reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to areas already exposed to
civilian overflights.” Id. (quotations omitted); see generally discussion infra Part
II.C.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
8. See id. (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
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guarded from unwarranted intrusion.9 Expectations of privacy
are most reasonable under these general standards when
intrusion occurs in the home and its surrounding curtilage.10
Consequently, privacy safeguards are strongest in this setting.11
Police intrusions into an individual’s home are presumptively
searches, and without a warrant, they are presumptively
invalid.12 But even in the residential setting, gaps in legal
protection exist, especially as new technology emerges. Though
the specter of continuous drone surveillance may threaten
societal notions of what the Fourth Amendment protects, a
destruction of privacy is not inevitable.
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .”). Available case law tends to focus on two aspects of this
constitutional protection: whether a search occurred, and if so, whether that
search was reasonable. See infra note 91 and accompanying text (discussing
present case law regarding aerial observation by police). Some scholars
maintain that Fourth Amendment protections, as applied by the courts, amount
to little more than enforcement of a property right to exclude others. See Orin S.
Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 809–13 (2004) (arguing that an
expectation of privacy is only held to be reasonable “when it is backed by a right
to exclude borrowed from real property law”).
9. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (stating that
the Fourth Amendment holds sacred “the right of a man to retreat into his own
home and there be free from unreasonable government intrusion”); Kerr, supra
note 8, at 810 (“A homeowner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
home.”).
10. See Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511 (stating that the Fourth Amendment
holds sacred “the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free
from unreasonable government intrusion”); Amelia L. Diedrich, Secure in Their
Yards? Curtilage, Technology, and the Aggravation of the Poverty Exception to
the Fourth Amendment, 39 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 297, 304 (2011) (stating that
the Supreme Court and lower courts have consistently recognized that people
have the highest expectations of privacy when in their homes).
11. See Diedrich, supra note 10, at 304 (stating that the Supreme Court has
made it clear that “physical entry of the home is the ‘chief evil against which the
wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed’” (quoting United States v. U.S.
District Court for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972))). Diedrich links
the concept of curtilage—the intimate area immediately surrounding a house—
to the Court’s special emphasis of protection from Fourth Amendment violation.
See Diedrich, supra note 10, at 304 (relating curtilage to previously adjudicated
Fourth Amendment matters).
12. See id. at 304–05 (discussing the strength of privacy law in the context
of the home).
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Currently, when police observe from the air, courts will
inquire whether the aircraft had a legal right to be flying there
and whether a reasonable man should have expected that his
activities were exposed to public viewing from the air.13 Some of
these inquiries likely now protect Americans from much drone
observation,14 but issues remain.
Widespread police operation of drones has the potential to
upend current Supreme Court precedent.15 While previous cases
have held that “mere visual observation does not constitute a
search,”16 that law is, in part, predicated on assumptions of
resource scarcity that will cease to be true in the face of
widespread police use of drones.17
Concerned members of Congress and civil libertarians tend
to focus on the broad societal “implications of increased [drone]

13. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–51 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that police observation made “from a public vantage point where
[the aircraft has] a right to be” does not require a search warrant so long as a
reasonable man would not have “expected that his [curtilage] was protected
from public or official observation”).
14. For example, a police drone that hovers over a property at ten feet,
peering through walls into the intimate details of a house and using
extrasensory perceptive devices would be a fairly clear-cut Fourth Amendment
violation under present case law. See id. at 450–51 (concluding that aerial
observations, made by officers in a helicopter hovering at a legal and reasonable
altitude, of the interior of a greenhouse within residential curtilage was not a
protected search by the Fourth Amendment, but that the outcome might be
different if the altitude was “contrary to law”); see also Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (ruling that the use of sense-enhancing technology not in
general public use to view intimate interior contents of a home was a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment).
15. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor,
J., concurring) (discussing how GPS tracking technology presents a problem for
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because it is “cheap in comparison to
conventional surveillance techniques” and it “proceeds surreptitiously, [so] it
evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices:
limited police resources and community hostility” (quotations omitted)).
16. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31–32 (discussing aerial observation precedent).
17. See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (discussing how GPS tracking technology
presents a problem for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because it is “cheap in
comparison to conventional surveillance techniques” and it “proceeds
surreptitiously, [so] it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law
enforcement practices: limited police resources and community hostility”
(quotations omitted)).
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use including potential privacy implications.”18 In the face of new
legislation and confusion in the lower courts, the Supreme Court
will likely have new opportunities to revisit its decisions
governing aerial observation. Before evaluating legislative or
judicial solutions, however, the upcoming changes to drone policy
must be outlined so that the precise vulnerabilities of existing
jurisprudence can be appreciated.
The novel and widespread use of drones will likely impact
many areas of the law.19 This Note considers a small slice of
relevant jurisprudence, mainly how courts should treat law
enforcement observations made by drones of American citizens or
their property in or near the domestic residence setting.20 Privacy
threats will no doubt originate from sources other than law
enforcement entities.21 In order to preserve a manageable scope of
review, this Note will not address the significant privacy threats
posed by privately operated drones, drones flying near the border,
or those used against foreign nationals in the United States. But
the primary threat to the average American’s privacy arguably
does not come from some of these sources.22 The routine use of
18. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-981, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT
SYSTEMS: MEASURING PROGRESS AND ADDRESSING POTENTIAL PRIVACY CONCERNS
WOULD FACILITATE INTEGRATION INTO THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM 3 (2012)
[hereinafter GAO DRONE REPORT].
19. See generally Rapp, supra note 6, at 623 (listing ground damage, air-toair collisions, communications interference, constitutional rights and privacy,
landowner rights, environmental concerns, piracy and governmental immunity
as issues that might arise with increased drone usage).
20. This Note considers the situation of residential curtilage because “[o]n
the public street, or in any other public place, [an individual] has no right to be
alone, and it is no invasion of his privacy to do no more than follow him about.”
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 391 (1960) (discussing
privacy in the context of tort law). The idea of privacy is inherently dependent
on mental conceptions of what information and conduct should reasonably
remain out of the public sphere. See id. at 392 (“It appears obvious that the
interest protected by this branch of the tort is primarily a mental one.”).
21. See John Villasenor, Observations from Above: Unmanned Aircraft
Systems and Privacy, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 498 (2013) [hereinafter
Villasenor, Observations] (describing non-law enforcement threats to privacy
from the use of drones, such as the use of the technology by private individuals).
22. After all, there are thousands of federal, state, and local law
enforcement departments that would stand to gain from the use of drone
technology.
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drones by police would, under present law, constitute a more
serious threat to privacy if the evidence gathered therefrom is
permitted to be used in court or stored indefinitely.
Rapidly evolving drone technology raises two primary
privacy concerns in the law enforcement setting: (1) that the
privacy rights of an individual will be violated; and (2) that the
presence of numerous lingering drones overhead will threaten
privacy in society as a whole by providing police with an
Orwellian omniscience.23 These two distinct privacy threats are
correlated, because the remedies for one problem will indirectly
alleviate the other.24 Therefore, both individual and societal
impacts must be considered when attempting to craft solutions to
the problems that drones pose.
Part II of this Note discusses drone capabilities and provides
background on FAA drone regulations prior to the 2012
Reauthorization bill. Part III explores recent legislation that will
expand the domestic use of drones. Part IV overviews Supreme
Court aerial-observation cases and reveals constitutional gaps
that may prompt the Supreme Court to revisit precedent in the
new context of drones. Part IV also covers the widening
divergence in the application of aerial observation case law.
Lastly, Part V discusses solutions, including currently pending
legislation, and how the courts should respond to safeguard
against improper drone surveillance.
II. Background
To understand what issues and solutions exist, we must
survey the contextual landscape. Recent changes to the drone
licensing structure, combined with evolving drone capabilities,
23. This broader privacy is difficult to define, because it is dependent on
mental conceptions of what information and conduct should reasonably remain
out of the public sphere. See Prosser, supra note 20, at 392 (“It appears obvious
that the interest protected by this branch of the tort is primarily a mental one.”).
24. Legislatures and courts have different roles to play when it comes to
protecting Americans from privacy violations. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 862
(discussing the roles that courts play in the development of the law). But both
entities must act affirmatively to best protect Americans from the multi-faceted
privacy threat posed by drones. Id.
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could allow the police to fly circles around Fourth Amendment
law. This Part explores the capabilities of drones and the process
by which the FAA approves them for use.
A. Familiar Concept, Foreign Sight
Drone technology burst onto the public scene during
America’s relatively recent military involvements in Afghanistan
and Iraq,25 but remotely controlled aircraft have been around in
one form or another for nearly one hundred years.26 Indeed,
drones have long been a part of public imagination through works
of literature and science fiction.27 Yet their presence has often
seemed distant. Now, rather than on a far-off planet or above a
foreign battlefield, the next stop for drones is directly above
American backyards.
Drones go by many names,28 but they are essentially aircraft
remotely controlled by pilots on the ground, by preprogrammed
instruction, or by pilots in chase aircraft.29 Dozens of agencies
25. See Paul McBride, Beyond Orwell: The Application of Unmanned
Aircraft Systems in Domestic Surveillance Operations, 74 J. AIR L. & COM. 627,
630 (2009) (describing the recent public consciousness of drone technology in the
military theater).
26. See id. (“At least as early as World War I, military theorists recognized
the value and potential of being able to remotely direct unmanned aircraft in
combat settings.” (citation omitted)).
27. See, e.g., STAR WARS: EPISODE V—THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Lucasfilm
1980) (depicting drone scouts on a distant, alien ice planet); GEORGE ORWELL,
NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR 2 (Plume Printing 2003) (1949) (describing a drone-like
action in the following scene: “In the far distance a helicopter skimmed down
between the roofs, hovered for an instant like a blue-bottle, and darted away
again with a curving flight. It was the Police Patrol, snooping in people’s
windows”).
28. For example, the U.S. government has labeled them unmanned
aircraft, unmanned aircraft systems, and drones at various times. See Pub. L.
No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 72 (enacted Feb. 14, 2012) (codified in scattered sections of
49 U.S.C.) (defining statutory terms); McBride, supra note 25, at 628 (“Although
widely known as UAVs or Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, the modern preference is
to redefine the technology as UAS [Unmanned Aircraft Systems].”). For ease of
reference, this Note will use “drones” to describe these aircraft.
29. See GAO DRONE REPORT, supra note 18, at 1 (“[Drone] aircraft do not
carry a pilot onboard but instead operate on pre-programmed routes and by
following commands from pilot-operated ground control stations.”).
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have already applied for and use drones to perform agency
functions.30 Drone certificate holders presently include more than
one
hundred
agencies,
universities,
companies,
and
organizations.31 Those groups include the U.S. Air Force,
numerous local police and sheriff’s departments, the California
Department of Forestry and Fire Protection, universities and
community colleges, the Department of Agriculture, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), Raytheon
Company, and Blackwater Airships LLC.32 From that sample of
interested parties alone, drone technology’s economic and lifesaving usefulness appears limited only by the imagination.
Wirelessly controlled airplanes marketed as “spy drones”
dotted the shelves during the 2012 holiday shopping season at
30. In April 2012, for example, the FAA released two lists of drone
certificates pursuant to the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) request for information covering the agency’s present
and past certificate authorizations. See Jennifer Lynch, FAA Releases Lists of
Drone Certificates—Many Questions Left Unanswered, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER
FOUNDATION (EFF) (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/ 2012/04/faareleases-its-list-drone-certificates-leaves-many-questions-unanswered
(last
visited Jan. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Lynch, FAA Release] (detailing the contents
of the FAA’s document release) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). More recently, the California National Guard has employed drones to
scout a massive wildfire near Yosemite National Park in the summer of 2013.
See California National Guard Launches Drone to Scout Yosemite-area Wildfire,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Aug. 28, 2013, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/201308-28/national/41508049_1_u-s-forest-service-angeles-national-forest-drone (last
visited Aug. 31, 2013) (“Firefighters battling the giant wildfire burning in the
Sierra Nevada added a California National Guard Predator drone to their
arsenal Wednesday to give them almost immediate views of any portion of the
flames chewing through rugged forests in and around Yosemite National Park.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
31. See GAO DRONE REPORT, supra note 18, at 16, 43 (detailing the FAA
partnerships with various universities and the federal agencies that have been
granted authorizations to operate drones).
32. See FAA List of Certificates of Authorizations, EFF, https://www.
eff.org/document/faa-list-certificates-authorizations-coas (last visited Jan. 13,
2013) (listing all approved, expired, and disapproved Certificates of
Authorization by the FAA) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
For an interactive map of where domestic drones have been authorized to
operate, see Jennifer Lynch, Newly Released Drone Records Reveal Extensive
Military Flights in US, EFF (Dec. 5, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/
12/newly-released-drone-records-reveal-extensive-military-flights-us
(last
visited Jan. 13, 2013) [hereinafter Lynch, Newly Released] (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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major U.S. retailers.33 The number of anticipated uses for
commercial and private drones seems to be matched in quantity
only by the number of news articles fearing their misuse.34 Pleas
for caution and safeguards are understandable, given the types of
presently available drones and the knowledge that technology
tends to shrink size and expand capabilities over time.

33. See, e.g., Parrot AR Drone 2.0, http://ardrone.parrot.com/parrot-ardrone/en/where-to-buy/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) (listing the points of sale in
the United States for the Parrot AR Drone 2.0) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review). These devices are little more than model airplanes with
cameras, but their interconnectivity with smart phones enables users to interact
with the aircraft in new ways.
34. For information describing the important new uses of drones, see infra
notes 29–36 and accompanying text. See also Humes, supra note 1, at 19 (“[T]he
goal is to curtail the possible abuses of drone technology while also trying to
aggressively exploit its potential in such areas as farming, firefighting, and
search-and-rescue operations.”); Sarah Kellog, Drones: Coming to the Skies Near
You, WASHINGTON LAWYER July–Aug. 2013, at 22 (“[T]he devolution of [drones]
from military/intelligence tools into peaceful domestic products has been
proceeding at a rapid pace.”); Sean Gallagher, Look to the Skies: Is It Time to
Stop Worrying and Love the Drone?, ARSTECHNICA.COM (Apr. 8, 2012),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/04/look-to-the-skies-is-it-time-to-stopworrying-and-love-the-drone/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) [hereinafter Gallagher,
Look to the Skies] (reporting that drones have such potential to revolutionize
flight and that they “could have a potentially huge impact on society and
culture—in both a positive and negative sense”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review). For articles describing the dangers drones pose to
privacy, see, e.g., Sean Gallagher, Here Comes Skynet: Army Drones Almost
Ready to Share Sky with Airlines, ARSTECHNICA.COM (July 5, 2012),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2012/07/here-comes-skynet-army-dronesalmost-ready-to-share-sky-with-airlines/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2013) (describing
the objection of privacy advocates with the ACLU and other organizations) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Lynch, FAA Release, supra note
30 (detailing the contents of the FAA’s document release); Jennifer Lynch, These
Drones Are Made for Watchin’, EFF (Aug. 16, 2012), https://www.
eff.org/deeplinks/2012/08/these-drones-are-made-watchin (last visited Mar. 7,
2013) [hereinafter Lynch, These Drones] (emphasizing the ease with which
drones can spy on the population) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Greg McNeal, A Primer on Domestic Drones: Legal, Policy, and Privacy
Implications, FORBES.COM, Apr. 10, 2012, http://www.forbes.com/sites/
Gregorymcneal/2012/04/10/a-primer-on-domestic-drones-and-privacy-implications/
(“[D]rones might raise unique privacy concerns because of their ability to gather
information from a particular ‘vantage point’ which is distinguishable from the
data we accumulate through our cellular phones or Internet searches.”).
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B. Drones Are a Unique Search Technology

The military quickly realized that in a rugged country like
Afghanistan, drones are particularly useful to perform dangerous,
behind-the-lines surveillance missions and hunt suspected
terrorists.35 The technology’s military desirability boils down to
simple economics and safety—operated from distant facilities in
the United States, the drones keep costs down and airmen safe.36
Military and civilian leaders have praised drones for freeing up
resources and performing long missions without stopping to
refuel or change pilots, and rightly so.37 Those benefits now
beckon domestically with a renewed energy, but they may not
arrive without collateral privacy consequences.
Drones vary widely in size and capabilities; some are tiny
versions of blimps or helicopters,38 while others are larger and
have a more traditional fixed-wing aircraft profile.39 And with
variety comes versatility.40 Many drones can hover or circle for
extremely long periods of time,41 can be outfitted with a variety of
35. See McBride, supra note 25, at 634–35 (discussing drone military
capabilities).
36. See Gallagher, Look to the Skies, supra note 34 (describing the benefits
of drones to the military).
37. See McBride, supra note 25, at 634–39 (examining the advantages and
uses of domestic drone technology).
38. See GAO DRONE REPORT, supra note 18, at 5 (“Small [drones] typically
weigh less than 55 pounds, fly below 400 feet above ground level, can stay
airborne for several hours, and can be used for reconnaissance, inspection, and
surveillance.” (quotations omitted)).
39. See id. (“Large [drones] generally fly at altitudes up to or greater than
60,000 feet, some can remain airborne for multiple days, and are generally used
for the purposes of surveillance, data gathering, and communications relay.”).
40. For a thorough exploration of drone technology and uses, see generally
Villasenor, supra note 21.
41. See Troy Roberts, On the Radar: Government Unmanned Aerial
Vehicles and Their Effect on Public Privacy Interests from Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence and Legislative Policy Perspectives, 49 JURIMETRICS J. 491, 499
(2009) (describing the ability of drones to stay aloft for hours or days at a time);
Richard Whittle, How It Works: Laser Beaming Recharges UAV in Flight,
POPULAR MECHANICS (July 28, 2012), available at http://www.popular
mechanics.com/technology/aviation/news/how-it-works-laser-beaming-rechargesuav-in-flight-11091133 (describing a system to charge drones by means of a
ground laser with the capability of keeping them aloft indefinitely).
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cameras and sensory equipment,42 and make little noise or
appearance in the sky.43 Some are larger than general aviation
planes and cost millions of dollars,44 while others can fit in a
backpack (or the palm of a hand) and cost less than a squad car.45
Drones are ideal for search-and-rescue missions or operations
in which there is vast territory to cover. Best of all for law
enforcement and emergency personnel, smaller drones can
squeeze into spaces too tight or perform tasks too dangerous for a
manned aircraft.46 One can easily imagine a squadron of cheap,
light drones combing a vast expanse of forest for lost hikers or the
beginnings of a forest fire.
It is perhaps durational flexibility that makes drones most
attractive to organizations operating within a narrow budget. A
manned helicopter or plane can only stay aloft for a few hours
before refueling. Additionally, manned aircraft are typically
42. See Roberts, supra note 41, at 492–97 (describing the ability of both
military and civilian drones to be outfitted with a variety of sensory equipment).
Roberts highlights the onboard sensors that drones have proven capable of
wielding effectively, including thermal and visual camera systems, electrooptical sensors, ocean color sensors, ozone sensors, gas chronograph, passive
microwave vertical sounders, and wall-penetrating technology. See id. at 498–99
(describing the onboard sensory capabilities of drones, including “highly
classified technology that allows observers to see through walls”). Roberts
envisions that police departments would use many of these capabilities for
“criminal surveillance, situational awareness, hot pursuit, accident or crime
scene forensics, and hazardous material reconnaissance.” Id. at 498.
43. See id. at 494–95 (“[Drones] are less noisy, cumbersome, and
conspicuous than conventional manned aircraft.”).
44. See id. at 494–95 (“[Drones] can come in all sizes, shapes, and
capabilities, ranging from the size of a softball to the size of a full size aircraft.”
(quotations omitted)).
45. See, e.g., Gary Martin and Viveca Novak, Push to Step Up Domestic Use
of Drones, SF Gate (Nov. 27, 2012), http://www.sfgate.com/nation/article/Pushto-step-up-domestic-use-of-drones-4064482.php#page-1 (last visited Dec. 22,
2012) (describing the capabilities of many different types of drones) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review); McBride, supra note 25, at 634–35
(same); Rapp, supra note 6, at 624–26 (same); Roberts, supra note 41, at 493–97
(outlining the unique capabilities of advanced drones). It is safe to say that by
the time of this Note’s publication, even these examples will likely be surpassed
by newer capabilities and technologies.
46. See Roberts, supra note 41, at 492 (“[Drones] are well suited for dull,
dirty, or dangerous missions that are instrumental in military operations.”
(quotations omitted)).
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larger, require several people, and can cost hundreds of dollars
per hour to operate.47
Many drones are much simpler than manned aircraft to fly.
As an example, a user can control the tiny, low-altitude Parrot
AR Drone 2.0 and view (on an ordinary smart phone) live video it
captures.48 A user with more substantial financial resources can
outfit drones with a bevy of advanced sensors—facial recognition
technology, night vision, telephoto zoom lenses, heat sensing
technology, wall-penetrating radar, and other electromagnetic
equipment that enhances observational capabilities well beyond
those of the naked eye.49 Certainly, larger drones will require
more skilled pilots and technology on the ground to be adequately
controlled, but the advantages over costly manned aircraft are
significant. Considering the sensory enhancement, durational
benefits, and resource efficiency, it is small wonder that the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) anticipates that law
enforcement will continue to expand its use of domestic drones.50
C. Present Drone Policy
The FAA has issued several sets of guidelines outlining its
treatment of domestic drones.51 Prior to 2012, a rigid,
47. See Gallagher, Look to the Skies, supra note 34 (“[T]he Shadowhawk [a
type of drone recently purchased by the Montgomery County Sheriff’s Office]
costs $40 an hour to operate, compared to the $500-per-hour cost of a full-sized
helicopter.”).
48. See Parrot AR Drone 2.0, supra note 33 (describing the control and
interface features of the Parrot AR Drone 2.0).
49. See Lynch, These Drones, supra note 34 (describing the sensory
capabilities of a typical police drone).
50. See Fed. Aviation Admin., Fact Sheet—Unmanned Aircraft Systems
(UAS) (Feb. 19, 2013), http://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.
cfm?newsId=14153 (last visited Feb. 24, 2013) [hereinafter FAA Fact Sheet]
(“Common uses today include law enforcement, firefighting, border patrol,
disaster relief, search and rescue, military training, and other government
operational missions.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The
FAA has confirmed that, since 1990, “the agency has authorized limited use of
[drones] for important missions in the public interest, such as firefighting,
disaster relief, search and rescue, law enforcement, border patrol, military
training and testing and evaluation.” Id.
51. See id. (discussing the Agency’s policies and procedures regarding
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individualized licensing process stymied the prospect of
widespread drone usage in the United States.52 The FAA
approval system now employed requires careful, case-by-case
agency evaluation of the operator’s request to use drones.53 The
FAA also has different approval standards for drones based on
size and capability.54 Many smaller drones, and drones operated
recreationally as model airplanes, are currently permitted by
regulation to operate at altitudes much lower than the minimum
acceptable altitudes for helicopters and fixed-wing aircrafts.55
Government users—including local law enforcement and
public universities—may operate drones only after obtaining a
Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) from the FAA.56 The
COA restricts the drone operation to a defined airspace and
“includes special provisions unique to the proposed operation.”57
Designation of the drone as an experimental aircraft is another
avenue for drone licensing, but public-use drones typically go
through the more detailed COA process.58 The FAA will
drones); Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National Airspace System, 72
Fed. Reg. 6689 (Feb. 6, 2007) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 91) (same); FED.
AVIATION ADMIN., UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS OPERATIONS IN THE U. S.
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM—INTERIM OPERATIONAL APPROVAL GUIDANCE
UNMANNED AIRCRAFT (2005), http://www.eoss.org/faa/AFS_400_UAS_POLICY_
05_01.pdf (same).
52. See FAA Fact Sheet, supra note 50 (detailing the process for approving
an operator’s request to use drones).
53. See id. (detailing the process for approving an operator’s request to use
drones).
54. For example, recreational use of unmanned aircraft is governed by FAA
Advisory Circular 91–57, which “generally limits operations to below 400 feet
above ground level and away from airports and air traffic.” Id. Furthermore,
small drones weighing 4.4 pounds or less now receive special treatment and an
accelerated approval process, subject to certain restrictions. See id. (detailing
the approval process for small unmanned aircraft).
55. See id. (discussing applicable rules on model airplanes and FAA
Advisory Circular 91–57 (June 9, 1981)). Aircraft operating under these model
airplane provisions are only permitted to be used for recreational or personal
purposes. Id.
56. See id. (detailing the process for approving an operator’s request to use
drones).
57. Id.
58. See id. (“COAs are available to public entities that want to fly a [drone]
in civil airspace.”).
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sometimes deny COA requests, but those denials are almost
invariably
for
safety-of-flight
reasons,
not
privacy
considerations.59 A new mandate for the expanded use of drones,
however, will scrap the current policies of case-by-case
authorization.
Congress has made clear its intention to rapidly expand
domestic drone activity. In February 2012, the legislative
reauthorization of the FAA carried with it a requirement that
the Agency promulgate regulations and develop a
comprehensive plan for the integration of drones into the
national airspace system.60 As a result, by some estimates there
could be 30,000 or more drones operating in U.S. skies in the
next few decades.61 The increasing law enforcement preference
for warrantless spying techniques—for example, the Justice
Department’s warrantless surveillance has increased 600% in
the past decade62—may help explain why a third of the public
59. For example, the FAA has previously denied the Ogden Police
Department a COA for using a nocturnal surveillance blimp drone to monitor
high crime areas because its operation would be unsafe for the national
aerospace system. See Letter from Dean E. Fulmer, FAA, to Chief Jon Greiner,
Ogden
Utah
Police
Department
(Sept.
8,
2011),
available
at
https://www.eff.org/document/ogden-2011-coa-status-document (describing the
reasons for denying the police application for COA).
60. See FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-95,
126 Stat. 11 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.) (detailing
statutory requirements and deadlines); John Villasenor and Benjamin Wittes,
Opinion, Regulating Domestic Drones on a Deadline, WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2012
(describing the requirements of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of
2012), available at http://www. brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/04/20drones-wittes-villasenor.
61. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST: FISCAL YEARS 2010–
2030, at 48 [hereinafter FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST] (2010), http://www.
faa.gov/data_research/aviation/aerospace_forecasts/2010-2030/media/2010%20
Forecast%20Doc.pdf. This number compares with approximately 18,000
commercial aircraft and 230,000 general aviation aircraft that operate in the
United States currently. See GAO DRONE REPORT, supra note 18, at 4.
Federal agencies are planning to increase their use of UAS’s. State
and local governments envision using UAS’s to aid in law
enforcement and firefighting. Potential commercial uses are also
possible, for example, in real estate photography or pipeline
inspection. UAS’s could perform some manned aircraft missions with
less noise and fewer emissions.
62. See David Kravets, Justice Department’s Warrantless Spying Increased
600 Percent in Decade, WIRED.COM (Sept. 27, 2012), http://www.
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fears that the use of drones by police will threaten their privacy
interests.63
III. The Importance of Recent Legislative Developments
A. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012
In 2012, Congress passed the FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012,64 covering fiscal years 2011 through 2014.65
As previously discussed, the reauthorization law carried with it a
requirement that the Agency promulgate regulations and
implement a comprehensive plan to “accelerate” the integration
of drones into the national airspace system by the end of
September 2015.66 Pursuant to that mandate, Congress
established a series of requirements and deadlines for the FAA to
include in its comprehensive drone plan.67
The first phase involves the formulation of a “Comprehensive
Plan” that requires the Agency to report to Congress on
anticipated rulemakings,68 methods to enhance safety and phase
wired.com/threatlevel/2012/09/ warrantless-surveillance-stats/ (last visited Feb.
17, 2013) (detailing the sharp increase in pen-register and trap-and-trace
methods of warrantless eavesdropping) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
63. See Joan Lowy, AP-NCC Poll: A Third of the Public Fears Police Use of
Drones for Surveillance Will Erode their Privacy, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Sept. 27,
2012), available at http://ap-gfkpoll.com/uncategorized/our-latest-poll-findings13 (detailing a poll examining popular attitude toward police drone use).
64. Pub. L. No. 112-95, 126 Stat. 11 (enacted Feb. 14, 2012) [hereinafter
the Reauthorization] (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 332(a)(3), 126 Stat. at 73. “The plan . . . shall provide for the safe
integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system
as soon as practicable, but not later than September 30, 2015.” Id. (emphasis
added).
67. See id. § 332(a), 126 Stat. at 73–74 (describing the contents of the plan,
deadlines, and reporting requirements to Congress). To understand where the
FAA is in meeting these deadlines as of September 2012, see GAO DRONE
REPORT, supra note 18, at 24–25 (detailing selected FAA Modernization and
Reform Act of 2012 requirements and the status of agency action in response
thereto).
68. These rulemakings would define and establish broad registration,
licensing, and safety standards. See Pub. L. No. 112-95, § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. at
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in drones to the national airspace system.69 Regarding public
unmanned aircraft systems,70 a separate section requires the
FAA to expedite the issuance of certificates of authorization,
collaborate with agencies to open airspace, and generally simplify
the process for permitting agencies to use drones.71
Congress also required the Agency to develop an integration
roadmap by February 2013 and make further rulemakings for
small unmanned systems and an updated program integrating
unmanned aircraft into the airspace environment.72 But safety—
73–74 (outlining the standards for drone registration).
69. See id. § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 73 (describing the phased-in approach to
drone integration into the national airspace system).
70. “The term ‘public unmanned aircraft system’ means an unmanned
aircraft system that meets the qualifications and conditions required for
operation of a public aircraft (as defined in section 40102 of title 49, United
States Code).” Id. § 331 (a)(1), 126 Stat. at 72. That section of title 49 states, in
relevant part:
(41) “public aircraft” means any of the following:
(A) Except with respect to an aircraft described in subparagraph (E),
an aircraft used only for the United States Government, except as
provided in section 40125(b).
(B) An aircraft owned by the Government and operated by any person
for purposes related to crew training, equipment development, or
demonstration, except as provided in section 40125(b).
(C) An aircraft owned and operated by the government of a State, the
District of Columbia, or a territory or possession of the United States
or a political subdivision of one of these governments, except as
provided in section 40125(b) . . . .
49 U.S.C. § 40102 (a)(41) (emphasis added).
71. See id. § 334(a), 126 Stat. at 76 (describing Congress’s mandate for new
guidelines expanding the use of public unmanned aircraft systems). Section 334
does state that the FAA should provide guidance “on a public entity’s
responsibility when operating an unmanned aircraft without a civil
airworthiness certificate . . . ,” but nothing in the act suggests that the
responsibilities are privacy concerns. Id. § 334 (a)(4), 126 Stat. at 76. Congress’s
goal appears to be that the FAA rapidly and safely introduce drone technology.
See id. § 332(a)(3), 126 Stat. at 73. “The plan . . . shall provide for the safe
integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems into the national airspace system
as soon as practicable, but not later than September 30, 2015.” Id. (emphasis
added). The word privacy does not appear in the Act’s mandate to the FAA
regarding drones. Id.
72. See id. § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 74 (“Not later than 18 months after [its
first report to Congress] . . . the Secretary shall publish . . . [rules covering]
small unmanned aircraft systems[,] . . . [and] update . . . the Administration’s
most recent policy statement on unmanned aircraft systems.”). This roadmap
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not privacy—was the consistent focus of Congress’s
requirements.73 This focus coincides with the FAA’s conception of
its own role in the process.74 Congress thus charged the FAA with
developing a safe and rapid integration of drones to the domestic
sphere, without any initial framework addressing inevitable
Fourth Amendment implications.
B. Legislative Incentive to Operate Drones Without Restrictions
The absence of privacy protections in the Reauthorization is
conspicuous, considering the ease with which some measures
could have been included.75 Congress’s intent may simply have
been to confront privacy at a later date with separate legislation.
But regardless of why privacy protections were not originally
included in the Reauthorization, the effect is, in essence, to
accelerate a speeding car toward an unfinished bridge. Whether
that bridge can best be spanned by further congressional action,
state legislative responses, or judicial reinterpretation is the
subject of Part V.76 As it stands, Congress continues to pressure
the FAA to meet legislative deadlines—some of which having

has proven elusive. An FAA website updating the public on UAS initiatives
makes no mention of the status of the required roadmap. See generally
FED.
AVIATION
ADMIN.,
Unmanned
Aircraft
Systems
(UAS),
http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/uas/ (last visited Aug. 31, 2013) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
73. See id. § 332(a)(1), 126 Stat. at 73 (“[T]he Secretary of
Transportation . . . shall develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the
integration of civil unmanned aircraft systems.” (emphasis added)). There are no
fewer than 6 references to safety, and no references to privacy, in Section 332 of
the Act, which outlines the integration process. See id. § 332, 126 Stat. at 73–75
(outlining the desired integration process).
74. See FAA Fact Sheet, supra note 50 (“The FAA’s main concern about
[drone] operations in the National Airspace System (NAS) is safety.”).
75. Congress could have easily required that the FAA keep an updated
database of drone certificate holders. To date, the primary means for discovering
which organizations operate a drone is to make a FOIA request. See Lynch, FAA
Release, supra note 30 (describing the FAA’s most recent release of drone
certificate holders).
76. See infra Part V (discussing legislative and judicial remedies to better
protect citizens’ privacy).
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already been missed77—and the Agency has been putting portions
of its plan into action.78
While the main portion of the FAA’s response to the
Reauthorization is forthcoming, there will likely be an explosion
of drone usage by interested parties, including law enforcement
The
Reauthorization
will
likely
decrease
agencies.79
administrative burdens to own and operate a drone, and
therefore increase the market for creating new drones.80
Irrespective of how Congress responds to the privacy problem it
now confronts, increased drone operation by police may have
significant legal consequences for courts applying Fourth
Amendment principles because expanded drone use may change
the calculus for determining when a search by drones has
occurred.81

77. See GAO DRONE REPORT, supra note 18, at Highlights page (“FAA . . .
has begun making progress toward completing [congressional] requirements,
but has missed one deadline and could miss others.”).
78. See John Nolan, FAA Urged to Keep UAV Timetable for Test Sites,
DAYTON DAILY NEWS (Aug. 2, 2012, 3:03 PM), http://www.daytondailynews.com/
news/news/congress-urges-faa-to-stay-on-schedule-for-choosin/nP89J
(last
visited Feb. 17, 2013) (reporting on a letter from nine House members to the
FAA’s interim administrator regarding delays in the FAA’s implementation of
programs) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The FAA
responded that “[t]he agency is working to complete the proposal process for the
six test sites as required by the 2012 FAA Reauthorization Act.” Id.; see also
GAO DRONE REPORT, supra note 18, at 23 (describing how the FAA “has begun
making progress toward completing [congressional] requirements, but has
missed one deadline and could miss others”).
79. See FAA Fact Sheet, supra note 50 (describing potential drone interest
from domestic parties).
80. See RICHARD M. THOMPSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, DRONES
IN DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS AND
LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES 1, 15 (2012) (describing the efficiency effects that
increased drone usage would give their operators).
81. See McNeal, supra note 34 (“[D]rones might raise unique privacy
concerns because of their ability to gather information from a particular
‘vantage point’ which is distinguishable from the data we accumulate through
our cellular phones or Internet searches.”).
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IV. Messy Authority: Case Law’s Inconsistent Treatment of Aerial
Observation
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Florida v. Riley,82
California v. Ciraolo,83 and Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,84
primarily govern the issue of whether aerial surveillance
constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment.85 Their
inquiries are fact-intensive and closely decided. Each of these
decisions also has its foundation in the seminal privacy case of
82. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 450–51 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(concluding that aerial observations, made by officers in a helicopter 400 feet
above ground level, of the interior of a greenhouse located in a residential
backyard was not a ‘search’ protected by the Fourth Amendment). In Riley, the
Court considered the constitutionality of naked-eye observations made without a
warrant by police from an altitude of 400 feet. Id. at 447–48. The police were
looking for drugs growing in a greenhouse located within the defendant’s
residential curtilage. Id. The Court determined that the defendant’s expectation
that his property was free from aerial observation was not reasonable because
the police aircraft was flying “in the public airways.” Id. at 450–51. The
observation was therefore deemed not to be a search requiring a warrant. Id.
83. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (concluding that aerial
observations made by a fixed-wing plane at 1,000 feet was not a search). In
Ciraolo, the Court considered the constitutionality of naked-eye observations
made by officers in a fixed-wing plane at an altitude of 1,000 feet above ground
level of a fenced-in back yard within the curtilage of a home. Id. at 209. The
Court doubted that, in 1967 while ruling on the Katz case, Justice Harlan
“considered an aircraft within the category of future electronic developments
that could stealthily intrude upon an individual’s privacy.” Id. at 215
(quotations omitted). The Ciraolo Court therefore decided that the Fourth
Amendment “does not require the police traveling in the public airways at
[1,000 feet] to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible to the naked
eye.” Id.
84. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (“We hold
that the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from
navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”). In
Dow Chemical, the Court examined whether naked-eye-enhancing photographs
of an industrial complex made from 12,000, 3,000, and 1,200 feet above ground
level on behalf of the Environmental Protection Agency were a search under the
Fourth Amendment. Id. at 230. The Court determined that no industrial
curtilage doctrine protected the complex from police observation like that of a
private residence, and that the flights were made from the public airways. Id. at
234–35. The Court decided that an industrial complex is more akin to an open
field and is therefore validly subject to observation by those in the public
airways. Id. at 239.
85. See McBride, supra note 25, at 642–46 (reviewing case law covering
aerial observation by police).
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Katz v. United States.86 When examined together, these cases
reveal a need for reevaluation when it comes to how courts decide
whether aerial observation constitutes a search. The Court’s
habitual return to Katz for guidance suggests that it is not ready
to abandon that decision’s foundational protection of reasonable
expectations of privacy.87 As discussed in Part V below, a careful
return to the holding of Katz may suggest a solution to the drone
conundrum.
A. Katz v. United States: A Starting Point for Drawing the
Privacy Line
In Katz, the police eavesdropped on the defendant while he
was calling from a public phone booth with the door closed.88 The
Court ruled that a Fourth Amendment search occurs “when the
government violates a subjective expectation of privacy that
society recognizes as reasonable.”89 The Court rejected the
government’s formulation of the issue, which attempted to center
the Court’s focus on the degree to which a constitutionally
protected area should be free from penetration.90 Instead, the
86. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352–53 (1967). In Katz, the police
eavesdropped on the defendant while he was talking on the phone in a public
phone booth with the door closed. Id. at 348–49. The Court ruled that a Fourth
Amendment search occurs “when the government violates a subjective
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.” Id. at 361 (Harlan,
J., concurring). The Court rejected the petitioner’s formulation of the issue,
which attempted to center the Court’s focus on the degree to which a
constitutionally protected area should be free from penetration. Id. at 350.
Instead, the majority emphasized that the Fourth Amendment extends across
trespass law to protect individuals, not places. Id. at 351; see also Riley, 488 U.S.
at 449 (citing the Ciraolo and Katz decisions for their influence on Fourth
Amendment privacy law); Dow Chemical, 476 U.S. at 230, 234 (same); Ciraolo,
476 U.S. at 211–15 (citing Katz repeatedly for its influence and guidance on
Fourth Amendment privacy law).
87. See supra note 86 and accompanying text (discussing Katz and the use
of Katz by other courts in aerial observation cases).
88. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351–52 (describing the defendant’s actions).
89. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring).
90. See id. at 350–51 (majority opinion) (“We decline to adopt this
formulation of the issues.”). Instead, the court went on to conclude that what a
person reasonably “seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to
the public, may be constitutionally protected.” Id. at 351.
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majority emphasized that the Fourth Amendment transcends
trespass law to protect individuals, not merely places.91
Justice Harlan provided a key clarification in his influential
concurrence that, to determine how much protection is required,
the court should consider the location where the alleged search
occurs.92 The method of police observation is largely irrelevant.93
Instead, a court should ascertain whether an individual’s
expectation of privacy, under the circumstances, is reasonable.94
As a practical matter, courts will likely label an individual’s belief
as reasonable if it occurs in locations commonly understood to be
private.95 Therefore, the “invasion of a constitutionally protected
area by federal authorities is . . . presumptively unreasonable in
the absence of a search warrant.”96
The Court may never define an explicit list of constitutionally
protected areas.97 But the individual’s location while under
observation aids a court in its assessment of whether the
individual’s expectation of privacy is reasonable.98 Under this
91. See id. at 351–53 (stating that the trespass doctrine can no longer
control Fourth Amendment jurisprudence). Somewhat famously, the majority
opinion authored by Justice Stewart declared that “the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places.” Id. at 351.
92. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring) (noting that, although the Fourth
Amendment protects people and not places, the amount of protection afforded to
those people requires reference to a place).
93. See id. at 362 (“[R]easonable expectations of privacy may be defeated
by electronic as well as physical invasion.”); Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A
Blueprint for adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-First Century
Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1312 (2002) (describing Justice Harlan’s
emphasis on the importance of the individual’s actions, and not those of the
police).
94. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355–56 (1967) (discussing the
defendant’s reasonable expectation of privacy).
95. See id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J. concurring) (noting that, although the
Fourth Amendment protects people and not places, the amount of protection
afforded to those people requires reference to a place).
96. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J. concurring).
97. See id. at 351 (majority opinion) (“[The] effort to decide whether or not
a given area, viewed in the abstract, is constitutionally protected deflects
attention from the problem.” (quotations omitted)).
98. See id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J. concurring) (emphasizing that the location
of the individual, along with the actions taken by that individual to secure
privacy, is a key factor for a court to consider when evaluating whether an
observation was a search).
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interpretation of Katz, courts look past the sometimes difficult
problem of evaluating the intrusiveness of new police
technologies.99 Subsequent courts should therefore focus on what
actions the individual took and what degree of privacy he should
have reasonably expected. But the Supreme Court failed to
confirm this line of reasoning in subsequent aerial observation
controversies during the 1980s.
B. Missed Opportunities for Consistency
The Supreme Court considered two cases in 1986 that
partially delineate the bounds of reasonable expectations of
privacy in aerial observation cases.
In Ciraolo, the Court considered the constitutionality of
naked-eye observations made by officers in a fixed-wing plane at
an altitude of 1,000 feet above ground level of a fenced-in back
yard within the curtilage of a home.100 The Court doubted that, in
1967 while ruling on the Katz case, Justice Harlan “considered an
aircraft within the category of future electronic developments
that could stealthily intrude upon an individual’s privacy.”101 The
Ciraolo Court therefore decided that the Fourth Amendment
“does not require the police traveling in the public airways at
[1,000 feet] to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is visible
to the naked eye.”102 But Justice Harlan wrote that, in general,
an individual need only exhibit a reasonable expectation of
privacy to be protected from any government means of
interference.103 Justice Harlan’s point was that the Constitution
entitles the individual to protection regardless of the means
99. See Simmons, supra note 93, at 1312 (describing how Justice Harlan’s
emphasis on the importance of the individual actions resolves difficulties courts
may face in evaluating reasonable expectations).
100. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986) (describing the facts
of the case).
101. Id. at 215 (quotations omitted).
102. Id.
103. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (“The critical fact in this case is that [one who occupies a phone
booth] shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll . . . is surely entitled to
assume that his conversation is not being intercepted.”).
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employed against him.104 But the Ciraolo Court appears to, at
least partially, slip past this nuance due to the difference in
technology employed to intrude.
In Dow Chemical, the Court examined whether photographs
of an industrial complex made from altitudes of 12,000, 3,000,
and 1,200 feet on behalf of the Environmental Protection Agency
were a search under the Fourth Amendment.105 The Court
determined that that no industrial curtilage doctrine protected
the complex from police observation like that of a private
residence, and that the flights were in public airspace.106 An
industrial complex is more akin to an open field and is therefore
validly subject to observation by those in the public airways.107
The majority acknowledged that “[i]t may well be . . . that
surveillance of private property by using highly sophisticated
surveillance equipment not generally available to the public . . .
might be constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”108
Therefore, Dow Chemical impliedly does not provide courts with a
sufficient basis to permit drone over-flights of residential
properties.
But again, the Court grounded its reading of Katz on the
position of the aircraft, one that was “lawfully in the public
airspace immediately above” the complex.109 Both decisions (Dow
Chemical and Ciraolo) thereby rested much of their evaluation on
when, where, and how the observer conducted its surveillance.110
Though Dow Chemical involved the use of precision cameras, the

104. See id. (deemphasizing the focus of the judicial inquiry on precisely
what method the police had been using to observe the defendant).
105. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 230 (1986)
(describing the facts of the case).
106. See id. at 234–35 (discussing the Court’s reasoning).
107. See id. at 239 (discussing the Court’s reasoning).
108. Id. at 238.
109. Id. at 238–39.
110. See id. at 239 (“We hold that the taking of aerial photographs of an
industrial plant complex from navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by
the Fourth Amendment.” (emphasis added)); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
215 (1986) (concluding that aerial observations made by a fixed-wing plane at
1,000 feet was not a search) (emphasis added). The Court could have instead
focused its rulings on the activities of the individual under observation.
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observations were of an industrial complex, not a residence.111
Ciraolo explicitly involved a naked-eye police observation, and
the rationale would strain to support a broader aerial scenario.112
These cases missed an opportunity to reinforce a clear emphasis
on the individual being observed and the setting in which he was
observed.
C. Florida v. Riley: An Increasingly Ineffective Application of
Reasonableness
In Riley, the Supreme Court decided to apply the same
method-focused rationale, despite the use of a different aerial
technology—police helicopters. This similar approach suggests a
deliberate retreat from what could have been a firmer defense of
privacy—an approach made and evaluated without regard to the
surveillance technology employed.
The Riley decision was badly split. The four-justice plurality
concluded that an aerial police observation made “from a public
vantage point where [the aircraft has] a right to be” does not
require a search warrant so long as a reasonable man would not
have “expected that his [curtilage] was protected from public or
official observation.”113 This rationale leans heavily on whether
the aircraft making the observation had a legal right to be where
it was in the sky (pursuant to FAA regulations governing
airspace).114
Interestingly, a majority of the Court did not accept this
rationale.115 Justice O’Connor agreed with the final disposition

111. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (“We
hold that the taking of aerial photographs of an industrial plant complex from
navigable airspace is not a search prohibited by the Fourth Amendment.”).
112. See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215 (concluding that aerial observations made
by a fixed-wing plane at 1,000 feet was not a search).
113. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–51 (1989) (plurality opinion).
114. See id. at 451 (“We would have a different case if flying at that altitude
had been contrary to law or regulation.”).
115. Only Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Scalia, and Kennedy
joined the plurality opinion. See id. at 447 (describing the plurality opinion’s
supporters).
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but differed in her analysis.116 Along with Justices Brennan,
Marshall,
Stevens,
and
Blackmun,
Justice
O’Connor
deemphasized the FAA regulations in any privacy analysis, and
did not endorse the plurality’s analogy between helicopter
observations and ground-level observations.117 These five Justices
instead focused their judgment on the reasonableness of an
individual’s expectation of privacy.118 This reasonableness
determination is based on the circumstances of the case (such as
where the individual was and what precautions the individual
took to shield the property from public view).119 Justice O’Connor
argued that the Court should “ask whether the helicopter was in
the public airways at an altitude at which members of the public
travel with sufficient regularity” and that “society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable,” regardless of technical compliance with
FAA safety regulations.120
Additionally, Justice Brennan’s dissent, as joined by Justices
Marshall and Stevens, appears to anticipate a future technology
that would be more intrusive than the helicopters of the 1980s.121
He noted that the plurality appeared to dismiss the intrusiveness
of the helicopter merely because it had a legal right to be where it
was and due to the lack of “undue noise . . . wind, dust, or threat
of injury”122 created by its presence. Arguing that the proper
116. See id. at 452 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I concur in the judgment[but]
I write separately . . . to clarify the standard I feel follows from California v.
Ciraolo.” (citation omitted)). Justice O’Connor wrote that the plurality rests the
scope of its Fourth Amendment protection “too heavily” on whether the observer
was complying with FAA safety regulations. Id. She argued instead that it is
unreasonable “for persons on the ground to expect that their curtilage will not
be observed from the air at 1,000 feet” because air travel at that altitude is a
“sufficiently routine part of modern life.” Id. at 453.
117. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s
reasoning).
118. See supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s
reasoning).
119. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 453–54 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring) (describing the factors that a court should consider).
120. Id. (emphasis added).
121. See id. at 461–62 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (discussing why the legal
position of the observing aircraft is unimportant when determining reasonable
expectations of privacy).
122. Id.
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analysis depends on safeguarding the privacy and security of
private citizens, Justice Brennan asked the Court to “imagine a
helicopter capable of hovering just above [the ground] without
generating any noise, wind, or dust at all . . . . Suppose police
employed this miraculous tool to discover not only what crops
people were growing . . . but also what books they were
reading.”123 This hypothetical is quite similar to the capabilities
possessed by certain modern high-tech drones.124 The dissent
thus addresses a model approach for the Supreme Court to take
when applying aerial observation law to drones precisely because
it imagines the potential abuse of the plurality’s emphasis on the
location of the observing aircraft.
Courts may decide to break from present case law because of
the differences between helicopter and manned aircraft compared
with unmanned drones.125 These cases may not apply to
observations made from aircraft using cameras that enhance
sensory abilities—as would be the case with most drones—
because such an observation loses any tenable comparison to the
proverbial policeman on a public street.126 At some point, the
analogy loses its credence in the face of an overly piercing spy
technology, at least if some degree of privacy is to be retained.
When technology emerges that fundamentally alters the privacy
analysis, change becomes appropriate.127 Drones may very well be
the line in the sand.

123. Id. at 462–63.
124. See supra notes 37–42 and accompanying text (discussing the
capabilities possessed by certain modern high-tech drones).
125. See Eyes in the Sky: The Domestic Use of Unmanned Aerial Sys.,
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Sec. and
Investigations of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter
UAS Hearing], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/113th/hear_
05172013.html (statement of Tracey Maclin, Boston University School of Law)
(discussing the inapplicability of much of current aerial observation precedent to
drone operations).
126. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 449–51 (1989) (describing the
policeman on the public street analogy).
127. See id. at 462–63 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (questioning whether the
Riley plurality would maintain its position if a hypothetical—and very dronelike—technology existed that could circumvent reasonable expectations of
privacy).
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Even if the aerial observation cases apply to generalized
drone operations, the precedent may be too muddied to permit a
clean solution. As a consequence of Riley’s sharply divided
reasoning, lower courts have applied the law intermittently.128
Courts’ rulings on aerial observation cases in no fewer than nine
states have applied one of four different approaches to existing
Supreme Court precedent.129 Colorado and Oregon have used
different approaches within their own jurisdictions.130 The Court
of Appeals of Texas upheld a helicopter observation made from an
altitude of 100 feet, a height that would likely not even pass
Riley’s emphasis on aircraft location.131
There is either confusion as to what factors should govern, or
a desire by courts to select their own methods.132 Either way, the
lower-court confusion may eventually lead to additional
challenges at the Supreme Court. The introduction and
proliferation of a technology that tests the unstable basis of
previous decisions is the perfect opportunity to resolve a lower
court split and clarify the line in the sand, should the Court
choose to accept such a case.

128. See State v. Bryant, 950 A.2d 467, 476–79 (Vt. 2008) (discussing the
four different approaches state and federal courts are using to apply Supreme
Court precedent).
129. See id. (discussing the four different approaches state and federal
courts are using to apply Supreme Court precedent).
130. See id. (detailing some of the different approaches state and federal
courts are using to apply Supreme Court precedent).
131. Compare Moss v. State, 878 S.W.2d 632, 636 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994)
(“[T]he helicopter then circled . . . . coming down to about 100 feet over three or
four residences.”), with Riley, 488 U.S. 451 (plurality opinion) (“We would have a
different case if flying at that altitude had been contrary to law or regulation.”).
Flying an aircraft at 100 feet likely would contravene the FAA’s minimum safe
altitude requirements, which mandate at least a 500 foot clearance of people or
structures. See 14 C.F.R. part 91.119(c) (“[A]ircraft may not be operated closer
than 500 feet to any person, vessel, vehicle, or structure.”). See also Henderson
v. People, 879 P.2d 383, 391 (Co. 1994) (holding that the provision of a television
news helicopter to police for purposes of warrantless observations at 500–700
feet of defendant’s shed was not a search).
132. See Bryant, 950 A.2d at 476–79 (discussing different approaches of
other state courts).
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D. Kyllo v. United States133: The Importance of Sensory
Enhancement

The Supreme Court considered the issue of whether police
use of a thermal imaging device constituted an improper
residential search in Kyllo.134 Its ruling has potential implications
in the context of emerging drone technology. The five-to-four
majority held that the use of a sense-enhancing technology to
view the contents of a home was a search within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.135 The case also discussed the
appropriate interpretation of Katz under more modern
circumstances.136
The Kyllo majority rejected the contention that a passive
collection of extra-sensory information emanating from the
exterior of a home (without revealing intimate details of the
interior) was reasonable.137 Instead, the Court determined that
“obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information
regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have
been obtained without” physical, in-person inspection of a
residence “constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the
technology in question is not in general public use.”138 This
statement effectively means that a naked-eye observation from a
133. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (deciding that the use
of a sense-enhancing technology not in general public use to view the contents of
a home was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment). In Kyllo,
the Court considered the constitutionality of warrantless observations made by
police across the street from a residence using thermal imaging technology. Id.
at 29. The Court gave great weight to the fact that the observations were of the
home. Id. at 31. But the Court also included an ill-defined caveat that a search
technology must not be in general public use for the subject’s expectation of
privacy to remain reasonable, seemingly without regard to the location of the
individual. Id. at 34–35.
134. See id. at 29 (“This case presents the question whether the use of a
thermal imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect
relative amounts of heat within the home constitutes a ‘search’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
135. See id. at 40 (discussing the majority’s holding).
136. See id. (discussing the role of Katz in the context of thermal imaging
technology)
137. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of
Kyllo).
138. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
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public vantage point is likely not a search, while technology that
improves observation beyond what an un-aided person can sense
must be questioned further.
The majority’s test in Kyllo tracks closely with Katz. Police
are not required to “avert their eyes” from criminal activity.139
There will always be close cases involving rapidly emerging
technologies. But the majority’s test may not actually demand eye
aversion.140
Kyllo’s standard applies: (1) when there is an enhancement
technology, (2) when the interior contents of a house could be
ascertained through no other means, and (3) when a technology is
not so prevalent as to defeat a reasonable individual’s expectation
of privacy.141 An interesting question arises when one considers
whether a drone is inherently a sense-enhancing technology
(regardless of the onboard cameras or equipment). Arguably, a
drone augments the user’s ability to collect sensory information
by extending the operator’s visual and auditory capacities to
previously impossible vantage points. But it is unlikely a court
would adopt this reasoning because without any additional
equipment (such as telescopic camera lenses, thermal imaging
devices, etc.), drones provide no independent sensory
enhancement. It remains to be seen whether courts will
distinguish between images captured by navigational cameras
onboard drones and those directed intentionally downward on
their surveillance subjects. A court using Kyllo to evaluate the
facts of a drone case may wish to distinguish between these
different cameras. The closest analogue is, understandably, to
helicopter and fixed-wing aircraft which are discussed in Part
IV.A–C of this Note.142 Like those aircraft, they are more
accurately a platform technology that carries sensory technology

139. Id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
140. See supra note 135 and accompanying text (discussing the holding of
Kyllo).
141. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (discussing the
court’s test).
142. See supra notes 88–113 and accompanying text (discussing the
technology in previous aerial observation cases).
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on board.143 Therefore, the equipment carried by the drone should
determine whether Kyllo applies.144
Interestingly, the Kyllo test leaves open the possibility that
the permissibility of using a particular technology can change
over time. Widespread drone usage may have precisely that effect
on the social conceptions of the reasonable expectation of
privacy.145 Drones may someday share the same familiarity that
the public apparently had with the small planes in Ciraolo and
Dow Chemical.146 If so, the existing aerial observation cases
would offer little constitutional protection because many drones
would have the capability to remain at a legal altitude, yet also
make observations far beyond the abilities of a manned helicopter
or plane considered by Riley.
The Court acknowledged that “[i]t would be foolish to
contend that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the
Fourth Amendment has been entirely unaffected by the advance
of technology.”147 As an example, the majority pointed to aerial
observation cases.148 The Court wondered openly “what limits
there are upon this power of technology to shrink the realm of
guaranteed privacy.”149 This statement acknowledges two
important concepts—technological advances will continue to
stress constitutional protections from undue searches, and the
Court has a role in defining appropriate boundaries for those
advances.150 As drones represent a major advance in technology,

143. See McBride, supra note 25, at 657–59 (discussing the capabilities that
drones present as unique compared with other platform technologies such as
helicopters).
144. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (“We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information . . . constitutes a search . . . .” (emphasis added)).
145. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 865–67 (discussing the interaction of evolving
technologies and society).
146. See FAA AEROSPACE FORECAST, supra note 61 (describing the FAA’s
forecast of a wide variety of potential future commercial, public, and private
uses for drones in America).
147. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33–34 (2001).
148. See id. (citing the Ciraolo and Dow Chemical decisions).
149. Id.
150. See id. (describing the tensions and duties of the court in privacy
matters such as this).
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the Court would therefore be well within precedent to adjust the
rules accordingly.
The dissent describes the privacy interest in Kyllo as
trivial,151 and the state’s methods as unobtrusive, akin to
assessing the volume level of sound emanating from the Katz
phone booth rather than the conversation itself.152 But rather
than regulating the manner of police invasion or the nature of
content overheard, the question is whether an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy was disturbed.153 The
information gathered by the police in Kyllo was not merely data
regarding the presence or absence of heat.154 The police
discovered relative heat in particular locations of the house,
which led them to make inferences about the contents of the
residence’s interior.155 The dissent’s analogy comparing heat to
the volume in Katz would be more apt if the eavesdropping police
in Katz had somehow tried to use the volume of the phone booth
conversation to make an inference as to the defendant’s
conversation.156 In fact, that would have presented a different
issue for the Katz Court (and would resemble the issue actually
before the Kyllo Court).

151. By “trivial,” the dissent meant to imply that the intrusion was minor
because the passive collection of heat radiation did not actually penetrate the
home’s interior. See id. at 45 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“After all, homes
generally are insulated to keep heat in, rather than to prevent the detection of
heat going out, and it does not seem to me that society will suffer from [such] a
rule.”).
152. See id. at 41–42, 50 (discussing the treatment of inferences as
searches).
153. See id. at 32–33 (discussing the Katz Court’s reasoning regarding
reasonable expectations of privacy).
154. See id. at 35 (challenging the Government’s arguments regarding the
detection of heat).
155. See id. at 36–37 (discussing the treatment of inferences as searches).
156. See id. at 49–50 (“By contrast, the thermal imager here disclosed only
the relative amounts of heat radiating from the house; it would be as if, in Katz,
the listening device disclosed only the relative volume of sound leaving the
booth, which presumably was discernible in the public domain.”).
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E. United States v. Jones: New Potential for Change

Supreme Court cases dealing with rapidly advancing
surveillance technologies have divided the Court over how to best
handle Fourth Amendment implications. In the recent case of
United States v. Jones,157 five of the Justices expressed their
considerable hesitation in the face of a cheap, newly widespread,
and useful police surveillance technology—Global Positioning
System (GPS) tracking technology.158 The Court examined
whether a GPS tracking device mounted on the undercarriage of
a suspect’s Jeep constituted a search.159 The four-justice plurality
opinion authored by Justice Scalia looked largely to the property
law of trespass to conclude there was a search, and a warrant
was required.160 But Justice Scalia acknowledged, with caution,
that “[w]e may have to grapple with . . . ‘vexing problems’ in some
future case where a classic trespassory search is not involved and
resort must be had to Katz analysis; but there is no reason for
rushing forward to resolve them here.”161 Drone technology
should present precisely this sort of nontrespassory search issue
that could compel Justice Scalia and others to revive a more
basic, Katz-like approach. For instance, in a recent and fiery
dissent, Justice Scalia excoriated the Court for its allowance of
157. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (“We hold that
the Government’s installation of a GPS device on a target’s vehicle, and its use
of that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements, constitutes a search.”
(quotations omitted)). In Jones, the Court considered the constitutionality of
police placement and monitoring of a GPS tracking device affixed to the
defendant’s vehicle. Id. at 948. The Court looked to the historical origins of the
Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at
953. The narrow majority rejected the concurrence’s application of an
“exclusively Katz[-based] reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test,” instead
concluding that Katz should be confined more to “[s]ituations involving merely
the transmission of electronic signals.” Id.
158. See id. at 948 (discussing the facts of the case).
159. See id. (“We decide whether the attachment of a Global-PositioningSystem (GPS) tracking device to an individual’s vehicle, and subsequent use of
that device to monitor the vehicle’s movements on public streets, constitutes a
search or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
160. See id. at 950 (“As explained, for most of our history the Fourth
Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for government
trespass upon the areas . . . it enumerates.”).
161. Id. at 954.
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unwarranted DNA collection for the purpose of cross referencing
it against a database of incriminating samples.162
In Jones, Justice Sotomayor opined that the unique qualities
of a new technology should be evaluated to properly apply Katz
analysis.163 GPS tracking technology presents a problem for
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because it is “cheap in
comparison to conventional surveillance techniques and, by
design, proceeds surreptitiously, [so] it evades the ordinary
checks that constrain abusive law enforcement practices: ‘limited
police resources and community hostility.’”164
Justice Sotomayor identified GPS technology as a “tool so
amenable to misuse” that its unique attributes should be taken
into account when evaluating applying Katz.165 Justice Sotomayor
asked, somewhat rhetorically, “whether people reasonably expect
that their movements will be recorded and aggregated in a
manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at
will, their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so
on.”166 She implied they would not.167
Justice Alito’s concurrence in Jones also noted that “science
has brought forth far more effective devices for the invasion of a
person’s privacy than the direct and obvious methods of
162. See Maryland v. King, 133 S.Ct. 1958, 1982 (2013) (“The Court hastens
to clarify that it does not mean to approve invasive surgery on arrestees or
warrantless searches of their homes. That the Court feels the need to disclaim
these consequences is as damning a criticism of its suspicionless-search regime
as any I can muster.”). With a message that drafters of police drone legislation
would do well to remember, Justice Scalia wrote “[t]he Fourth Amendment
forbids searching a person for evidence of a crime when there is no basis for
believing the person is guilty of the crime or is in possession of incriminating
evidence.” Id. If left unaddressed, drones are precisely the sort of technology
that could make this kind of searching rampant.
163. See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“[P]hysical intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of
surveillance.”).
164. Id. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 956 (“I would also [question] the appropriateness of
entrusting to the Executive, in the absence of any oversight from a coordinate
branch, a tool so amenable to misuse, especially in light of the Fourth
Amendment’s goal to curb arbitrary exercises of police power.”).
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oppression which were detested by our forebears and which
inspired the Fourth Amendment.”168 He determined that the
Constitution’s protections should adapt with technology.169
Justices Sotomayor and Alito thus described the dangers of GPS
technology that, almost word-for-word, could be applied to the
capabilities of drones and the problems that widespread police
surveillance employing drones would entail. If the Supreme Court
views the threat of drone surveillance similarly, restrictions on
unwarranted drone use could be forthcoming.
V. Solutions: Closing the Privacy Gap
The goal of any privacy rules should be to effectively and
clearly balance the legitimate interests of law enforcement with
the need to protect privacy and civil liberties against excessive
government intrusion.170 This balance is not easily struck. What
follows, then, is a list of possible remedies and suggestions that
may begin to guard against inappropriate drone use by law
enforcement. The most effective overall solution will likely
emerge from multiple sources, because legislatures, courts, and
agencies have varying functions, responsibilities, tools, and
expertise.
A. Protective Legislation
Legislation will be important in protecting individual privacy
in a variety of contexts, including the law enforcement setting.171
168. Id. at 959 (Alito, J., concurring).
169. See id. (“The Court argues—and I agree—that we must assur[e]
preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted. But it is almost impossible to think of late
18th-century situations that are analogous to what took place in this case.”
(quotations and citations omitted)).
170. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 861 (“It is generally agreed that the general
pragmatic goal of both constitutional and statutory law governing search and
seizure is to create a workable and sensible balance between law enforcement
needs and privacy interests.”).
171. See id. at 867–68 (discussing the value of legislatures as bodies that
“enact generalized rules for the future”).
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But Congress may not be able to effectively control law
enforcement organizations not under its direct control.172
Solutions must therefore emanate from many levels of
government in order to preserve the effectiveness of drone
technology’s many advantages and simultaneously guard privacy.
1. Federal Legislation: General Recommendations
To begin with, there are certain general principles that
Congress should consider adopting. Legal author Troy Roberts
has assembled a list of recommendations for legislative fixes that
would plug many privacy holes.173 His proposed solutions include
some of the following:
1. Write plain language statutes requiring warrants for
[Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV)] searches.
2. Focus efforts on nonvisual navigation and safety of
flight technology.
3. Require any UAVs to power down sensory enhancing
technology when transitioning to the target of the
warrant or other mission.
4. Require logs of sensory enhancing technology use on
all UAVs.
5. Create exceptions for immediate warrantless
observation requirements, such as criminal chases,
fires, and chemical exposures.
6. Establish an objective regulatory body to enforce the
rules on operators.174

In particular, Roberts’s third, fourth, and fifth recommendations
would allay many general societal fears regarding drones because
they would reduce police incentives to employ large numbers of
drones for observational purposes.175
172. See infra note 223 and accompanying text (discussing case law on the
topic).
173. See Roberts, supra note 41, at 517 (detailing proposed legislative
solutions).
174. Id.
175. Recall that a major fear of increased drone use prompted by the recent
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Brookings Institute fellow John Villasenor has added that
federal legislation may be prone to over-reaching by containing so
many privacy protections that legitimate police work will be
impeded with little victory for privacy.176 In a recent article
addressing drones and privacy, Villasenor describes one scenario
where more stringent rules would stifle an otherwise critically
important piece of criminal evidence:
Suppose that a brutal assault that takes place on a sidewalk is
captured on video by a government‐operated [drone] that
happens to be monitoring traffic on the adjacent street.
Suppose further that the video from the [drone] turns out to be
the only available evidence that can identify the perpetrator.
It would defy common sense if the police or prosecutors were
barred by new [drone] privacy rules from making use of this
information.177

Villasenor therefore cautions that a blanket warrant requirement
would be foolish.178 He instead argues for a more limited scope of
legislated privacy protections targeting the data retention of
drone images and mandating that police keep thorough public
records of drone operations.179
In addition to Roberts’s and Villasenor’s recommendations,
police drones should be employed only on specific missions, not
sent to scour a city for undiscovered crimes. At a minimum, this
legislation has been concern by some that it will create an electronic blanket of
police presence overhead. See Somini Sengupta, Rise of Drones in U.S. Drives
Efforts to Limit Police Use, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2013), http://www.
nytimes.com/2013/02/16/technology/rise-of-drones-in-us-spurs-efforts-to-limituses.html?pagewanted=all (“To me, it’s Big Brother in the sky.” (quoting Dave
Norris, a city councilman in Charlottesville, Virginia) (quotation marks
omitted)).
176. See Villasenor, supra note 21, at 511 (“It is far harder to [draft privacy
legislation] without negatively impacting the use of [drone] in applications that
raise few or no privacy concerns.”).
177. Id.
178. See id. (“Legislation that would include a blanket prohibition on
governmental use of private UAS data in criminal investigations would also be
ill advised.”).
179. See id. at 512 (“The best solutions are those that increase privacy
protections without impeding reasonable, non‐privacy‐violating uses. Laws
addressing data retention by government [drone] users . . . [along with those
that] require law enforcement agencies to keep thorough records identifying the
details of flight operations.”).
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limitation would minimize the number of ethical quandaries like
the one raised by professor Villasenor above. Despite its appeal to
logic, Villasenor’s hypothetical seems to concede too much ground
to the technical capabilities of drones. This same sort of logic
would seemingly justify almost any form of invasiveness widely
deployed in public spaces so long as the technical capability
exists.180 But the legislature has the flexibility to customize its
laws to address a unique technical threat while taking advantage
of its unique capabilities.181 If political will permits passage of a
drone privacy bill, the real challenge will be to carve out the right
exceptions.
Perhaps the best way to ensure that private citizens are not
the subject of regular Fourth Amendment search violations—
from any source—is to incentivize police and prosecutors by
restricting the availability of drone-collected evidence at trial.182

180. See id. at 511 (“If, in the example in the previous paragraph, the
images of the assault on the street had been captured by a [drone] operated by a
television station instead of by the government, it would make no sense to place
them beyond the legal reach of investigators.”). Villasenor’s preferred route for
privacy protection is to lean on a mosaic of narrowly-decided opinions. See id. at
516 (“In combination, however, these rulings indicate that the Fourth
Amendment is likely to provide significantly more protection from government
[drone] observations than is commonly assumed.”). But this is a risky
proposition, for there is already much lower court confusion in interpreting
these doctrines. See discussion supra note 128 (describing circuit differences in
the application of aerial observation cases).
181. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 871 (“Judicial rulemaking is limited by
strong stare decisis norms that limit the ability of judicial rules to change
quickly; in contrast, legislatures enjoy wide-ranging discretion to enact new
rules. The difference favors legislatures when technology is in flux.”).
182. See id. at 882–87 (acknowledging the advantages courts have over
legislatures in protecting privacy). Kerr describes two advantages that courts
have over legislatures for crafting meaningful privacy rules in the face of new
technologies: courts can make “cautious judgments on a case-by-case basis,” and
courts can be better trusted to “serve the public interest” apart from the
influence of special interest groups. Id. at 882. More importantly, Kerr notes
that courts are the best body to “intervene in the area of criminal procedure
because . . . legislatures don’t give a damn about the rights of the accused.” Id.
at 886 (quotations omitted) (citing Donald A. Dripps, Essay, Criminal
Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; Or, Why Don’t
Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1079 (1993)). But courts are inherently limited in effectiveness by a judge’s
familiarity with the technology at issue. Id. at 886.
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This is probably best accomplished by legislation,183 but the
courts can play a role in the process.184
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure should also be
modified so that the normal inadvertent discovery standards
would only apply when the drone is conducting a specific mission
or action.185 In other words, the legislature should alter the legal
evidentiary standards so that a court could not admit evidence
gathered from a drone while it patrols the skies without a
warrant. As described by Roberts, reasonable exceptions could be
made for circumstances involving immediate public safety.186
2. Federal Legislation: Specific Solutions
The recently proposed Drone Aircraft Privacy and
Transparency Act of 2013187 (DAPTA) would, if enacted, fill many
critical privacy holes. The bill would amend the FAA
Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 to provide guidance and
limitations absent from that legislation regarding the integration
of drones into the national airspace system.188 Acknowledging the
“potential for unmanned aircraft system technology to enable
183. See id. at 871 (“Judicial rulemaking is limited by strong stare decisis
norms that limit the ability of judicial rules to change quickly; in contrast,
legislatures enjoy wide-ranging discretion to enact new rules. The difference
favors legislatures when technology is in flux.”).
184. See id. at 882 (discussing the two primary advantages of courts: they
are institutions that can “regulate interstitially, making cautious judgments on
a case-by-case basis” and they can be better trusted to serve the public interest).
185. The inadvertent discovery problem is illustrated by the following
example: “if police are permitted to conduct drone surveillance for a search and
rescue mission and inadvertently observe a violation of criminal law or
regulation, the evidence would not be admissible in a criminal prosecution.”
THOMPSON, supra note 80, at 19–20. Roberts’s third suggestion would solve the
problem. See Roberts, supra note 41, at 517 (“Require any [drones] to power
down sensory enhancing technology when transiting to the target of the warrant
or other mission.”). Thus the problem of requiring police to turn a blind eye to
crime intrusively observed in the process of transit evaporates.
186. See id. (detailing the author’s recommendations to cover privacy gaps).
187. H.R. 1262, 113th Cong. (2013).
188. See id. (“To amend the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 to
provide guidance and limitations regarding the integration of unmanned
aircraft systems into United States airspace, and for other purposes.”).
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invasive and pervasive surveillance without adequate privacy
protections,” the bill presents a detailed series of findings and
requirements that would severely restrict the ability of law
enforcement to use drones as evidence-gathering machines.189
For example, the Secretary of Transportation would first be
required to carry out a study, in conjunction with other executive
agencies, that will identify “any potential threats to privacy
protections posed by the integration of” drones.190 The bill would
constrain the Secretary of Transportation (and thereby, the FAA)
from approving drone licenses for organizations, including law
enforcement bodies, that do not comply with data collection
requirements in the bill.191 Law enforcement agencies would have
189. Id. § 2(6).
190. Id. § 3.
191. Id. (“[T]he Secretary of Transportation may not approve, issue, or
award any certificate, license, or other grant of authority [unless certain data
collection and data minimization statements are made].”). These requirements
would force police to operate drones in accordance with well-defined privacy
principles. Id. Under the bill, police must disclose of the following:
(1) the individuals or entities that will have the power to use the
unmanned aircraft system;
(2) the specific locations in which the unmanned aircraft system will
operate;
(3) the maximum period for which the unmanned aircraft system will
operate in each flight;
(4) whether the unmanned aircraft system will collect information or
data about individuals or groups of individuals, and if so—
(A) the circumstances under which such system will be used; and
(B) the specific kinds of information or data such system will collect
about individuals or groups of individuals and how such information
or data, as well as conclusions drawn from such information or data,
will be used, disclosed, and otherwise handled, including—
(i) how the collection or retention of such information or data that is
unrelated to the specified use will be minimized;
(ii) whether such information or data might be sold, leased, or
otherwise provided to third parties, and if so, under what
circumstances it might be so sold or leased;
(iii) the period for which such information or data will be retained;
and
(iv) when and how such information or data, including information or
data no longer relevant to the specified use, will be destroyed;
(5) the possible impact the operation of the unmanned aircraft system
may have upon the privacy of individuals;
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to supply a data minimization statement before they would be
permitted to operate drones for police purposes.192 The inclusion of
these extra requirements for police is potentially significant,
beyond the public notice provided by these reporting requirements.
The bill explicitly interjects the authority of the Secretary of
Transportation into the privacy considerations of drone
operation.193 This potentially subjects law enforcement agencies to
an extra layer of review and an extra forum to which people can
bring their grievances.
The bill also prohibits generalized surveillance, with
exceptions made for exigent circumstances.194 Even in those
exigent circumstances, however, documentation “justifying the
exception” shall be submitted to the Secretary of Transportation,
(6) the specific steps that will be taken to mitigate any possible
impact identified under paragraph (5), including steps to protect
against unauthorized disclosure of any information or data described
in paragraph (4), such as the use of encryption methods and other
security features that will be used;
(7) a telephone number or electronic mail address that an individual
with complaints about the operation of the unmanned aircraft system
may use to report such complaints and to request confirmation that
personally identifiable data relating to such individual has been
collected;
(8) in the case that personally identifiable data relating to such
individual has been collected, a reasonable process for such individual
to request to obtain such data in a timely and an intelligible manner;
(9) in the case that a request described in paragraph (8) is denied, a
process by which such individual may obtain the reasons for the
denial and challenge the denial; and
(10) in the case that personally identifiable data relating to such
individual has been collected, a process by which such individual may
challenge the accuracy of such data and, if the challenge is successful,
have such data erased or amended.
192. See id. (detailing the bill’s technical requirements).
193. See H.R. 1262, 113th Cong. § 3 (2013) (“[T]he Secretary of
Transportation may not approve, issue, or award any certificate, license, or
other grant of authority [unless certain data collection and data minimization
statements are made].”).
194. See id. (“Subsection (a) shall not apply in exigent circumstances.”).
“Exigent circumstances” are defined as conditions that arise when “a law
enforcement entity reasonably believes there is . . . an imminent danger of death
or serious physical injury . . . [or] a high risk of terrorist attack by a specific
individual or organization.” Id.
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and the information acquired during the emergency would be
minimized and deleted if unrelated to the exigent circumstances.195
The bill would disallow the direct or indirect gathering of that
evidence without a warrant.196 This is perhaps the most important
aspect of the bill because it imposes resource costs (namely, time
and money) on law enforcement agencies that will likely have the
effect of reducing the number of drones in the air.197 Any bill with a
realistic hope of controlling the use of such an inexpensive and
nimble technology must impose these kinds of procedural
impediments, the added benefit of which is to inform the public
about how and when the government uses this technology.
Finally, the bill articulates a comprehensive system of
enforcement and remedies, including injunctive relief, and, in the
case of intentional violations, treble damages.198 While it is
unknown how many of these protections will survive the legislative
process, in its present state the bill systematically addresses the
most fundamental Fourth Amendment concerns raised by police
drone use. This legislation, or another bill like it, would validate
the notion that drones are different and deserve special safeguards
because of their unique capabilities.199 In order to stay ahead of the
195. Id.
196. See id. (“[N]o evidence derived [from a public use drone operating under
the exigent circumstances exception] . . . may be received in evidence in any
trial, hearing, or proceeding in or before any court, grand jury, [etc.].”).
Furthermore, as a general matter, no law enforcement agency may use a drone
“except pursuant to a warrant issued using the procedures described in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.” Id.
197. See supra note 17 and accompanying discussion (describing resource
scarcity as a limitation on privacy abuses).
198. See id. § 4 (governing enforcement). Enforcement of the bill would be
accomplished through a variety of avenues, including civil actions by states on
behalf of their residents, a robust slew of private rights of action, enforcement
by the FAA and the Federal Trade Commission, license revocation, and the
reservation by Congress to enact new laws governing drone privacy. See id.
(governing enforcement).
199. For example, drones may pose the same widespread danger as
imperceptible GPS tracking devices. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945, 956 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing how GPS tracking
technology presents a problem for Fourth Amendment jurisprudence because it
is “cheap in comparison to conventional surveillance techniques” and it
“proceeds surreptitiously, [so] it evades the ordinary checks that constrain
abusive law enforcement practices: limited police resources and community
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technology’s problems, substantial safeguards should be in place
before drones’ widespread use.
Another comprehensive bill introduced at the start of the
113th Congress was the Preserving American Privacy Act200
(PAPA). The bill contains many of the same provisions as the
DAPTA bill.201 Key differences include PAPA provisions for:
(1) written consent by surveilled individuals to incidental
warrantless observation;202 (2) a broader warrantless observation
exception for emergency situations that includes conspiratorial
activities of organized crime and terrorism;203 (3) federal, state,
and local prosecutorial reporting on the drone operations and
(4) administrative
warrants
sought
pursuant
thereto;204
disciplinary procedures for intentional violations by officers and
employees of the United States;205 (5) specific provisions protecting
personal or familial activities from unwarranted private drone
collection of visual, sound, and physical impression information;206
hostility” (quotations omitted)).
200. H.R. 637, 113th Cong. (2013).
201. For example, both bills prohibit warrantless searches without some
kind of court approval or exception applying, and both bills have provisions
requiring the release of data minimization and usage statements. Compare id.
at § 2 (§ 3119b therein) (“[A] governmental entity shall submit to the Attorney
General a data collection statement . . . .”), with H.R. 1262, 113th Cong. § 3
(2013) (“[T]he Secretary of Transportation may not approve, issue, or award any
certificate, license, or other grant of authority [unless certain data collection and
data minimization statements are made].”).
202. See id. (excepting information gathered when written consent from the
observed party is obtained).
203. See H.R. 637, 113th Cong. § 2 (2013) (§ 3119c therein) (excepting
“conspiratorial activities characteristic of organized crime”).
204. See id. (§ 3119e therein) (“In March of each year the Attorney General,
an Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General, or
the principal prosecuting attorney of a State, or the principal prosecuting
attorney for any political subdivision of a State, shall report to the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.”).
205. See id. (§ 3119d therein) (describing administrative discipline
procedures for intentional violations of the act).
206. See id. (§ 3119f therein) (describing the private use of aircraft systems).
The bill would make it unlawful to:
[I]ntentionally operate a private unmanned aircraft system to
capture, in a manner that is highly offensive to a reasonable person,
any type of visual image, sound recording, or other physical
impression of a [sic] individual engaging in a personal or familial
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(6) a general prohibition on armed drones.207
Less comprehensive bills previously considered would have
addressed constitutional privacy issues in a more limited (or
vague) fashion; these shorter bills nevertheless indicate a desire
by many members of Congress to limit the use of drones for law
enforcement. They include the Preserving Freedom from
Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012,208 the Preserving
American Privacy Act of 2012,209 and the Farmers Privacy Act of
2012.210 While almost any addition would beneficially supplement
the deficient FAA Reauthorization, the privacy issues are
complex and would be best served by a coordinated legislative
effort.211 The most important part of any bill will be the degree of
specificity that can be reached with regard to defining the
protections it puts in place. Provisions with broader allowances
for police drone usage might provide superior protection from
abuse than more restrictive but loosely defined provisions.
Overall, Congress should use its advantages over courts to take
speedy action and make comprehensive and consistent rules.212
activity under circumstances in which the individual had a
reasonable expectation of privacy, through the use of a visual or
auditory enhancing device, regardless of whether there is a physical
trespass, if this image, sound recording, or other physical impression
could not have been achieved without a trespass unless the visual or
auditory enhancing device was used.
207. See id. § 2 (Section 3119h therein) (banning weaponized drones).
208. S. 3287, H.R. 5925, 112th Cong. (2012). The Senate version would have
prohibited “a person or entity acting under the authority, or funded in whole or
in part by, the Government of the United States” from using a drone to gather
evidence pertaining to criminal conduct without a warrant. Id. § 3.
209. See H.R. 6199, 112th Cong. (2012) (providing for limitations on the
domestic use of drones in investigating regulatory and criminal offenses).
210. H.R. 5961, 112th Cong. (2012). This legislation would have “prohibit[ed]
the EPA from conducting aerial surveillance of agricultural lands unless the
EPA has consent from the farmer, has provided public notice, or has obtained a
certificate of reasonable suspicion from the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia.” See Thompson, supra note 80, at 19 (discussing H.R.
5961).
211. See THOMPSON, supra note 80, at 19–20 (discussing legislative solutions
to privacy issues surrounding the use of drones in law enforcement
surveillance).
212. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 871 (“Judicial rulemaking is limited by
strong stare decisis norms that limit the ability of judicial rules to change
quickly; in contrast, legislatures enjoy wide-ranging discretion to enact new
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Recently, the House Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security and
Investigations held a lengthy series of hearings on the subject of
privacy solutions to police drones.213 Among the panelists were
John Villasenor (Brookings Institution), Gregory S. McNeal
(Pepperdine University School of Law), Tracey Maclin (Boston
University School of Law), and Chris Calabrese (American Civil
Liberties Union).214 Villasenor argues, both in his scholarly
writing and testimony, that a judicial solution to the problem will
have fewer legal consequences as compared with congressional
legislation.215 This argument is misguided because judicial
solutions are prone to inconsistencies.216 By contrast, panelist
Calabrese advocated for legislative action because Congress is in
the best position to swiftly effect change.217
Congressional questions that seemed to imply that drones
are just another tracking technology were met with disagreement
by the panelists, who maintained that drones are not the same
kind of danger; drones, they stated, may magnify bias and are
directly intrusive, targeted surveillance. 218 The principal
limitation of Villasenor’s court-based drone solution is that it
ignores Congress’s favorable position to establish a standard that
will preclude courts from rendering inconsistent privacy
protections. Because the extent to which current Supreme Court
aerial observation precedent can apply to police drone
surveillance, waiting for a Supreme Court revision will take years
(after many violations have occurred). New congressional
rules. The difference favors legislatures when technology is in flux.”).
213. See UAS Hearing, supra note 125 (discussing the hearing).
214. Id.
215. See id. (statements of John Villasenor, Brookings Institution)
(regarding his argument that the Fourth Amendment is capable of adequately
protecting Americans’ privacy).
216. See discussion supra note 128 (discussing how judicial rulings can be
prone to inconsistency).
217. See UAS Hearing, supra note 125 (describing his position on the best
rulemaking vehicle to protect privacy).
218. See id. (statements of John Villasenor, Brookings Institution; Gregory
S. McNeal, Pepperdine University School of Law; Tracey Maclin, Boston
University School of Law; and Chris Calabrese, American Civil Liberties Union)
(describing, in different ways, how drones are a unique privacy threat).
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legislation that protects privacy could be passed in a matter of
months.
Without addressing drones directly, some aspects of existing
federal statutes may be applicable to drones in a way that would
limit their potential for abuse by law enforcement.219 For
example, some courts have linked video surveillance techniques
with hyper-intrusive search methods such as wiretapping and
bugging, thereby recruiting an existing statutory regime to
provide protection from a new source of abuse.220 Similarly,
elements of federal wiretap statutes could be made to apply to
certain drone surveillance.221
Despite the attractiveness of a legislative answer to a
congressionally exacerbated problem, there may be limits on how
much protection Congress can actually mandate. Many law
enforcement activities involve strictly state actors enforcing their
laws, actions that may not be fully covered by federal privacy
legislation.222 State officials cannot usually be compelled to
enforce a federal program.223 Additionally, while Congress can
219. See THOMPSON, supra note 80, at 19 (“Additionally, Congress could
create a similar cause of action for privacy violations caused by drone
surveillance as contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2712, which creates a civil remedy for
violations of the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications Act, and certain
provisions of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978.”).
220. See United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984)
(“Television surveillance is identical in its indiscriminate character to
wiretapping and bugging.”). Since the Torres decision, “six other courts have
accepted this interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, with the effect [being
that] the Title III [requirements] have become constitutionalized [at least for
video surveillance].” Roberts, supra note 41, at 511.
221. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), (1)(b)(ii) (2008) (prohibiting the
intentional interception of oral communications through the use of a mechanical
device when the device transmits communications by radio).
222. For example, the Preserving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance
Act of 2012 limits its application to “a person or entity acting under the
authority, or funded in whole or in part by, the Government of the United
States.” S. 3287, 112th Cong. § 3 (2012).
223. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (striking down a
federal law compelling state officials to execute elements of federal gun
legislation). The Printz Court went on to declare that “[t]he Federal Government
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular
problems, nor command the States' officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program. It matters not whether policymaking is involved . . . such
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our [constitution].” Id.
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legislate changes to the federal rules of evidence and procedure,
state legislatures must, in many cases, act to incorporate them
into state law.
3. State Solutions
Because Congress may not be able to legislate privacy
protections covering all state nor local drone activities, action by
the states may in some cases be necessary to solidify privacy
protection. Virginia and Florida state legislatures have already
begun to consider and enact legislation that would severely
restrict the use of drones within their borders.224 These state laws
would have little effect on the federal government’s use of
drones.225 Even so, preventing state and local police agencies from
using drones in all but the most exceptional scenarios would
constitute a major restriction on potential sources of privacy
violations, and may ease fears of a ubiquitous police presence
overhead.226

Congress may, however, be able to partially circumvent this prohibition through
controlling FAA’s licensing procedures (and denying drone licensing to
organizations that do not abide by its wishes).
224. See Hunter Stuart, Drone List Released by FAA Shows Which Police
Departments Want to Fly Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, THE HUFFINGTON POST
(Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/02/08/drone-list-domesticpolice-law-enforcement-surveillance_n_2647530.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2013)
(“A bill in Florida aims to ban police use of drones . . . with a few exceptions for
cases of terrorism, imminent danger or for search warrants . . . [and] a bill that
[would] . . . ban state and local agencies from using drones [recently] passed the
Virginia General Assembly.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
225. As discussed in Part V.A.1, “bills like Virginia’s are little more than
symbolic gestures, since ultimately it’s FAA that controls the airspace over the
United States.” Id.
226. See Sengupta, supra note 175 (“To me, it’s Big Brother in the sky”
(quoting Dave Norris, a city councilman in Charlottesville, Virginia) (quotations
omitted)).
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4. Municipal Solutions
Similar to state action, municipal action can have local
benefits to privacy protection. Charlottesville, Virginia, recently
became the first city to restrict the use of drones by its police
department in criminal cases.227 Seattle’s mayor also recently
ended the efforts of that city’s police department to use drones
after privacy advocates protested.228 The Berkeley, California,
city council considered declaring its airspace off-limits to drone
operations.229
Until a more permanent legislative solution emerges,
municipal actions will create a patchwork of protection from local
law enforcement use of drones for surveillance. But the courts
(specifically, the Supreme Court) have the ability to influence law
enforcement action to a much broader degree.
B. Judicial Remedies: Return to Katz or Enumerate a DroneSpecific Test
The Supreme Court may be the body best suited to fill
constitutional gaps because it can articulate existing precedent to
simultaneously protect legitimate uses of police drones and the
Fourth Amendment’s protective integrity.230 After all, the Katz
decision does not leave individuals inherently vulnerable to
unwarranted drone searches; the Riley court’s application of Katz

227. See id. (“Charlottesville, Va . . . became the first city in the country to
restrict the use of drones.”).
228. See Manuel Valdes, Seattle Mayor Ends Police Drone Efforts,
PRESS
(Feb.
7,
2013)
(republished
online
at
ASSOCIATED
http://www.usnews.com/news/us/articles/2013/02/07/ seattle-mayor-ends-policedrone-efforts) (describing the decision by mayor Mike McGinn to end the city’s
aspirations for police drones).
229. See Doug Oakley, Berkeley Shoots Down Plan to Ban Surveillance
Drones, OAKLAND TRIB., Dec. 19, 2012, http://www.mercurynews.com/topstories/ci_22223952/berkeley-shoots-down-plan-ban-surveillance-drones
(last
visited Aug. 31, 2013) (describing the council’s vote to ultimately not pass a ban
due to drones’ potential usefulness to fight crime and assist in disaster
operations) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
230. See generally supra Part IV.A–E.
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does.231 Recall that the legal standards articulated in Ciraolo,
Dow Chemical, and Riley were not designed with drones in mind,
and they leave holes in their privacy protections.232 Moreover,
their holdings are applied unevenly, even without the added
complication of novel drone technology.233 These irregularities
will become an issue in the case of drones because of their
potential widespread use by law enforcement.
In essence, the Riley and Kyllo pluralities, when taken
together, might theoretically allow a continuous retreat of the
line that delineates which private places police cannot invade.234
As drones become more prevalent, the Supreme Court may be
unable—or at least unwilling—to continue the Riley practice of
giving legal weight to the physical position of an observing
aircraft. The more that technology advances to become smaller,
cheaper, and more discreet, the less protection citizens will find
in a Fourth Amendment interpretation that rests the bulk of its
evaluation on the methods used by police.235 Additionally, it is
unclear what percentage of the population need use a technology
in order for it to qualify under Kyllo as sufficiently common.236
Evaluating reasonableness based (in part) on changing societal

231. See generally supra Part IV.A–E.
232. See generally supra Part IV.A–E.
233. See generally supra note 128 and accompanying text.
234. This is a consequence of how these courts link reasonability to the
methods of observation and public use of the technology. See Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (describing the test to determine when a search
has occurred in cases of advanced technology); Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445,
449–51 (1989) (describing the position of the police aircraft as an important
factor under consideration). But see Roberts, supra note 41, at 516 (“[T]he
manned flight aerial observation cases, culminating in Justice O’Connor’s Riley
concurrence, suggest that courts will protect the privacy of curtilage and
residences from unmanned aerial observation.”).
235. See Simmons, supra note 93, at 1322 (“The inconsistencies created by
considering the method of search only multiply as technologies become more
sophisticated and courts struggle to find the correct analogy for any given
surveillance method employed.”).
236. See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 47 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Despite the Court’s
attempt to draw a line . . . the contours of its new rule are uncertain because its
protection apparently dissipates . . . [when] technology is in general public
use . . . . Yet how much use is general public use is not [defined].” (quotations
and citations omitted)).
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usage of a technology may be confusing for both the general
population and police.
But these vulnerabilities only exist as long as the thin Riley
Court (or a like-minded) plurality continues to prevail.237 A
return to an interpretation of Katz that ignores the method of
police search would have many clarifying benefits.238 As a state
court interpreting Riley reminds us, “[t]echnology has produced
many and varied means of observation and surveillance. But the
fact that something can be done does not make the doing of it
constitutional.”239 Katz better protects basic and reasonable
expectations of privacy largely determined by the actions of the
individual seeking constitutional shelter.240 Though Katz may, at
times, engage in a somewhat circular logic,241 the advantage of
Katz is that it permits the judiciary to directly protect the
homeowner’s “right to be let alone,” irrespective of the police
technology employed to invade it.242 To avoid problems of circular
logic, the Court must clearly articulate to lower courts how they
237. Because the Riley Court emphasized the legality and commonality of
the technology employed by police in their observation, one could conclude that
once drones become legal and common, they could be used in the same way as
helicopters in Riley to conduct warrantless searches of homes from the air. See
supra notes 115–16 and accompanying text (discussing the application of Riley
to drone technology). A different, less vulnerable interpretation of Katz is
possible. See Simmons, supra note 93, at 1323–24 (concluding that, under Katz,
“the only relevant consideration is the result of the surveillance: what
information does the government acquire as a result of making the
observations?”).
238. See id. at 1312–13 (discussing the differing conclusions of lower courts
regarding the relevance of the search method when applying Katz).
239. State v. Bryant, 950 A.2d 467, 479 (Vt. 2008).
240. See generally supra Part IV.A.
241. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (“The Katz test—
whether the individual has an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable—has often been criticized as circular, and hence
subjective and unpredictable.” (citing in support 1 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE § 2.1(d), pp. 393–94 (3d ed. 1996))); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83,
97 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)) (criticizing the Katz decision’s elusive
standard); (criticizing the Katz decision’s elusive standard); Richard A. Posner,
The Uncertain Protection of Privacy by the Supreme Court, 1979 S.CT. REV. 173,
188 (same).
242. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 813 (discussing acceptable warrantless
methods of surveillance that nevertheless violate traditional notions of privacy).
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must determine whether the event, location, or information under
observation deserves protection.243
A return to Justice Harlan’s formulation of the Katz rule is
the most substantial change the Court could make because it
would
apply
irrespective
of
subsequent
technological
advancements in drones or any other surveillance platform.244
While courts are slow to catch up to changing technology,245 a
return to Katz’s method-irrelevant reasonability determinations
would be an effective placeholder protecting society until they do.
Many, however, have criticized Katz as an unworkable test,
and a return to the Katz formulation may not solve all problems
of judicial consistency.246 In the alternative to reemphasizing
Katz’s simple formulation, other methods might yet stall the
potential onrush of warrantless drone evidence in courts.
As it stands now, a judge or magistrate would likely grant or
deny a warrant after a case-by-case evaluation of the facts in
order to determine whether a requested search is reasonable.247
Where no warrant is obtained but drones are used, courts should
use a more well-defined sliding scale approach to evaluate
whether a search occurred.
A useful judicial test in Fourth Amendment situations must
“create a workable and sensible balance between law enforcement
needs and privacy interests” and be relatively clear.248 If an
explicit return to Justice Harlan’s formulation of Katz is too
243. See Simmons, supra note 93, at 1323–24 (concluding that, under Katz,
“the only relevant consideration is the result of the surveillance: what
information does the government acquire as a result of making the
observations?”).
244. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing the implications
of the Katz ruling).
245. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 862 (implying that judicially created rules
are best when technologies are stable).
246. See surpa note 241 and accompanying text (detailing criticisms of the
Katz ruling).
247. A court would draw on its experience in weighing public policy against
state need in other Fourth Amendment cases. See Kerr, supra note 8, at 861
(“The law should allow the government to investigate crime effectively . . . [yet
also] limit the power of government, in order to protect privacy and civil
liberties.”).
248. Id.

OVER YOUR HEAD, UNDER THE RADAR

1881

vague or unworkable for the Court, it must act quickly to
establish specific factors as a judicial test to achieve lower court
clarity. In order to determine if a police observation made by a
drone constitutes a search, courts should ask most of the
following questions when evaluating a motion to suppress:
1. Was the observation made by the drone accidental or
intentional;249
2. Were the police previously denied a warrant for the
surveillance operation, but decided to proceed
anyway;250
3. Were sensory-enhancing technologies used to obtain
the observations;251
4. Did the aircraft operate at an unsafe altitude while
making the observations;252
5. Was there
curtilage;253

a

physical

breach

of

a

property’s

6. Was the duration of observation unreasonably long;254
and
249. If intentional, this fact would weigh in favor of search.
250. A previous application and denial should weigh heavily against
admissibility of evidence from that source because a judge has, in essence, ruled
that there is insufficient justification for such an intrusion.
251. The more technologies are used, and to the degree to which those
technologies are not in general public use, the better a court can determine if
the observations were an invasive search. Courts would likely be confronted
with facial recognition technology, night vision, telephoto zoom lenses, heat
sensing technology, wall-penetrating radar, and other electromagnetic
measuring devices. See Roberts, supra note 41, at 498–99 (describing the
onboard sensory capabilities of drones, including “highly classified technology
that allows observers to see through walls”).
252. Illegal or dangerous operation of drones ought to be discouraged, so an
answer of “yes” to this factor would weigh in favor of search. Note that this
would by no means be the only factor evaluated, as some courts have done. See,
e.g., State v. Ainsworth, 801 P.2d 749, 750–52 (Or. 1990) (relying on the legality
of an aircraft’s position in the sky to determine whether a search has occurred).
253. If so, this fact would weigh in favor of the observation as a search. This
factor incorporates many of the valuable protections of privacy law that have
historically been a part of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See United States
v. Jones, 132 S.Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (“The text of the Fourth Amendment reflects
its close connection to property.”).
254. Under this prong, the longer the observation time, the more likely the
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7. Did the subject of the surveillance take protective
actions that indicated both a desire and a reasonable
expectation that his conduct was private?255

As factors accumulate in favor of the observation’s status as
a search or non-search, the burden establishing the opposite
result becomes more onerous. Each of the above elements will
allow the courts to determine the extent of intrusion, and the
needs of the state. The Court should attempt to firmly establish a
score-like tabulation of factors that would permit evidence,
trigger exclusion, or permit discretion.
This approach would also allow the courts to respect existing
precedent, and is modeled after Justice Sotomayor’s comments in
Jones.256 More serious need for using drone evidence would be
allowed to trump a trivial curtilage violation, thus avoiding some
of the ethical quandaries posited by Professor Villasenor above.257
This approach would still remain vulnerable to some circuit
irregularities along with many of the flaws inherent in the
current system. Ultimately, a workable judicial test is “more
readily attainable . . . when technologies are stable,” unlike in the
rapidly changing environment of drone aircraft.258 But at a
minimum, this approach could slow the potential abuse of police
drones as a practical matter until more comprehensive solutions
emerge.
Lastly, the Court could also rule that drones are per se senseenhancing technologies, regardless of the equipment contained on
board, because of drones’ ability to put police in previously
impossible positions of observation. This would have the effect of
triggering Kyllo’s protections. But for reasons discussed above,
that interpretation is not likely.259

event will be held a search.
255. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
256. See Jones, 132 S.Ct. at 955–56 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“[P]hysical
intrusion is now unnecessary to many forms of surveillance.”).
257. See supra note 178 and accompanying text (posing a hypothetical
intended to expose the problems associated with over-regulating drone use).
258. Kerr, supra note 8, at 862.
259. See generally discussion supra Part IV.E.
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VI. Conclusions: The Road Ahead
Drones do not have to be feared. But the expanded law
enforcement use of drones creates a complicated Fourth
Amendment problem for many courts. People will likely continue
to expect a high level of privacy in their homes, because the idea
of home is closely intertwined with privacy.260 The persistent
question has become this: will that expectation remain attainable
as technology—much of it with fantastic potential to save lives
and resources—advances inexorably?
It is important to keep in mind that each time police have
attained the technical ability to circumvent this privacy
expectation, the law has not unraveled to permit unrestricted
police observation of intimate domestic activity.261 Instead, the
legislature and courts have worked together to accommodate the
advances, thus preserving some level of privacy in the home. The
same cooperation must be accomplished here.
Before courts ever become involved, some solutions will likely
originate from a number of federal, state, or local legislative
bodies. These legislative measures will become an important fix
for Fourth Amendment holes while aerial observation
jurisprudence catches up with changing circumstances. Most
importantly, Congress should pass a detailed, comprehensive,
and enforceable law—the PAPA or DAPTA bills would be a
significant start—that would reduce public anxiety about drones,
inform the public about how and when the government uses this
technology, and concretely protect Fourth Amendment liberties.
Any bill with a realistic hope of controlling the use of such an
inexpensive and nimble technology must impose procedural
impediments that act to limit the appeal of widespread
employment. The thought of police drones carries with it a
260. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (“At the very core of
the Fourth Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” (quotations and
citation omitted)).
261. Indeed, some degree of privacy has survived the innovations of wiretapping, aerial observation, satellite observation, and sense-enhancing
technology. “Technology has produced many and varied means of observation
and surveillance. But the fact that something can be done does not make the
doing of it constitutional.” State v. Bryant, 950 A.2d 467, 479 (Vt. 2008).
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visceral Orwellian implication of “Big Brother” intruding where it
ought not.262 That fear must not be ignored, lest it be realized.
The elimination of drones hovering for extended periods of time
without a targeted purpose may substantially abate public fears
of a constant surveillance. People may be more inclined to
support drones if they are cast in the role of a lifesaving
vehicle.263
The Supreme Court should also take the earliest opportunity
to clarify its precedent on aerial observation issues. The most
protective action it could take would be to return the law
explicitly to the full protective potential of Katz. Barring that, the
Court should develop a clearly articulable standard for analysis
when drones are used by police without a warrant to gather
evidence. Judicial clarity and consistency would help ease public
fears about how police drones will be used in the future. Without
these reassurances, the imaginations (and fears) of private
citizens will likely run wild.
The aerial observation cases remain important for their
window into what kind of treatment the police’s use of drones
would presently enjoy. But Riley, Dow Chemical, and Ciraolo are
quite possibly less important strictly as legal precedent because
each of the cases is highly fact-specific.264 The cases are more
useful for understanding how the Supreme Court might act
someday if confronted with a drone case. The Court will likely
ask: (1) what is under observation; (2) who is observing; and
(3) how is the observation made.265 A swing towards privacy is
possible, but the Court must change its course by returning to the
roots of reasonable expectations.
262. See McBride, supra note 25, at 627–28 (discussing aspects of George
Orwell’s depiction of totalitarianism).
263. See GAO DRONE REPORT, supra note 18, at 5 (describing the important
uses of drones by law enforcement). Indeed, as many as 80% of respondents to
one survey support the use of drones for search and rescue purposes. See id. at
33 (“[Eighty] percent said they supported the use of UAS for search and rescue
missions.” (citing Monmouth University Poll, U.S. Supports Some Domestic
Drone Use, But Public Registers Concern About Own Privacy (June 12, 2012))).
But that same poll indicated that two-thirds of respondents would oppose using
drones to issue speeding tickets. Id.
264. See generally supra Part IV.
265. See generally supra Part IV.
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Unique threats to privacy may sometimes warrant special
protection. The Fourth Amendment makes much of that
protection possible, and successfully coordinated efforts from
multiple branches of government may even make it likely. But
privacy will never be inevitable.

